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THROUGH THE WIRE ACT 
John T. Holden* 
Abstract: Legalized sports gambling has become one of the hottest topics in state 
legislatures ever since the United States Supreme Court’s 2018 decision in Murphy v. National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n1 allowed states to begin legalizing the activity. As states began to 
offer sports wagering, gambling became front and center in the news and the Trump 
administration’s Justice Department took the opportunity to rewrite a 2011 Office of Legal 
Counsel opinion, expanding the scope of the most prominent federal anti-gambling statute. 
The re-interpretation of the scope of the Wire Act reversed the Department of Justice’s position 
that the statute only applied to interstate sports wagering, and instead incorporated all forms of 
interstate wagering. The new interpretation is exceptional because it follows years of failed 
legislative attempts to re-write the statute. The executive branch used this interpretation to 
circumvent the legislature and expand the scope of the statute. 
The nature of the Wire Act’s targeted activities is one of many questions surrounding a 
statute that was applied for decades with few questions. The rise of the internet has brought on 
many more questions regarding the scope of the Wire Act—questions that have become 
prescient in an era of expanded legal gambling. This Article analyzes the most significant 
questions regarding the application of the Wire Act and suggests that contrary to the 
Department of Justice’s 2018 opinion, the statute is intended to apply to a very small group 
of  activities. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Following the end of World War II, American politicians prepared for 
a spike in crime.2 There was a notable pattern of increased criminal 
incidents after major American conflicts like the Revolutionary War, the 
Civil War, and World War I.3 But the post-World War II years were 
different. Despite a minor rise in murders during the 1950s, there was no 
national crime wave as one might anticipate.4 However, while crime was 
not on the rise, gambling was.5 A number of theories emerged as to why 
gambling spiked following the Second World War, ranging from people 
having more money than they did during the pre-war Great Depression 
years, to Nihilism centering around the Atomic age and the threat of 
nuclear war, which prompted people to live the best life they could before 
the Cold War turned hot.6 
Despite being largely illegal, gambling was on the rise during the post-
World War II years; one poll in 1950 found that more than 57% of 
                                                   
2. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND THE INTERNET 46 (2005). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 46–47. 
6. Id. at 47. 
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Americans had paid to participate in a game of chance.7 Although reliable 
data on the value of the illegal gambling market during this time is 
uncertain, estimates from the early 1950s ranged from around $1 billion 
to $8 billion.8 The numbers, even if hyperbolic as estimated, attracted the 
attention of Congress, which took a particular interest in the assumed 
association between organized crime and gambling.9 This concern would 
prompt a near-decade-long process to enact legislation that specifically 
targeted organized crime’s money-making operations, the most notable of 
which at the time was indeed gambling.10 The federal Wire Act would be 
passed in 1961 and mark the first major statute to specifically target sports 
wagering on the federal level.11 
The Wire Act was at the time of its passage the crowning achievement 
of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s war on organized crime; but for 
many years, the statute was largely unfamiliar to those outside of the 
criminal law field. Until the internet came to be in virtually every home 
in America, few bothered to consider the exact scope of the statute and 
whether it applied to gambling activities other than sports wagering.12 In 
2001, the Eastern District of Louisiana,13 and subsequently the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, held that the Wire Act applied only to sports 
wagering and not to activities like online casino games.14 Despite the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling, the scope of the Wire Act remained uncertain to some. 
Such was the case until Illinois and New York sought guidance from the 
Justice Department as to whether the online sale of lottery tickets would 
offend the statute.15 In 2011, the Department of Justice concluded that the 
                                                   
7. Id. (citing a poll conducted by George Gallup that showed a 12% rise in gambling over the 
previous five years). 
8. Id. at 48. Estimating the size of the illegal gambling market remains an issue to this day, with 
some estimates putting the size of the illegal sports gambling at upwards of $400 billion; but, in 
reality, this is unknown and virtually impossible to measure. See Jordan Weissmann, Big Bucks or 
Bogus Betting Baloney?, SLATE (Nov. 21, 2014, 2:19 PM), https://slate.com/business/2014/11/adam-
silver-says-theres-400-billion-per-year-of-illegal-sports-betting-in-the-u-s-alone-seriously.html 
[https://perma.cc/PAY6-RHKG]. 
9. G. Robert Blakey, Legal Regulation of Gambling Since 1950, 474 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 12, 13–14 (1984).  
10. See Brett Smiley, Mailbag Mythbusting: The Wire Act and Sports Betting, Explained, SPORTS 
HANDLE (May 30, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/mailbag-mythbusting-the-wire-act-and-sports-
betting-explained [https://perma.cc/FH72-MA72]. 
11. Transmission of Wagering Information Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1961). 
12. See generally In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001). 
13. Id. at 480–81. 
14. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2002). 
15. See VIRGINIA A. SEITZ, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHETHER 
PROPOSALS BY ILLINOIS AND NEW YORK TO USE THE INTERNET AND OUT-OF-STATE TRANSACTION 
PROCESSORS TO SELL LOTTERY TICKETS TO IN-STATE ADULTS VIOLATE THE WIRE ACT (Sept. 20, 
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Wire Act only applied to sports betting, and this opinion on the law would 
remain the primary guidance on its scope for seven years.16 
In 2018, the Justice Department, under the Trump administration, 
rescinded the previous guidance and issued a new interpretation of the 
Wire Act’s scope.17 The new interpretation determined that the statute 
applies to a variety of online gambling activities beyond sports 
wagering.18 The new opinion followed several years of failed efforts, 
purportedly backed by casino magnate and Republican Party donor 
Sheldon Adelson, to legislatively override the Justice Department’s 2011 
opinion and pass a law banning all online gambling.19 The new opinion 
was put on hold for ninety days by Deputy Attorney General Rod 
Rosenstein in order to allow companies to come into compliance;20 but in 
the interim, the 2018 opinion was challenged by the New Hampshire 
Lottery, who asked for an injunction and declaratory relief, as states 
across the country looked for clear guidance.21 The New Hampshire 
plaintiffs prevailed at the district court in a narrow decision tailored to the 
facts of the case and the plaintiffs’ specific circumstances.22 
Despite the New Hampshire District Court’s ruling, many questions 
remain regarding the scope of the Wire Act. While the application of the 
statute to sports betting has never been in doubt, many questions arise as 
to exactly whose sports betting activities are implicated by the statute, as 
well as where exactly online betting can take place.23 Following the 
                                                   
2011) [hereinafter SEITZ MEMO], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/09/3
1/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf [https://perma.cc/V37R-5S3T]. 
16. See STEVEN A. ENGEL, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECONSIDERING 
WHETHER THE WIRE ACT APPLIES TO NON-SPORTS GAMBLING 1 (Nov. 2, 2018) [hereinafter ENGEL 
MEMO], https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1121531/download [https://perma.cc/AK72-YUU3]. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. Matthew Boyer, Sheldon Adelson and His Astroturf Lobbyists Don’t Want to Let You Gamble 
Online, WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 6, 2017, 6:27 PM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/sheldon-
adelson-and-his-astroturf-lobbyists-dont-want-to-let-you-gamble-online [https://perma.cc/LRD5-3T9B]. 
20. Letter from Deputy Att’y Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, Assistant Att’ys Gen., & Dir., Fed. Bureau 
of Investigation (Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter DAG Wire Act Letter], 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124286/download [https://perma.cc/7C96-APJJ]. 
21. See N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d 132, 136 (D.N.H. 2019); Eric Ramsey, New 
Hampshire Lottery Sues DOJ Over Wire Act Opinion, ONLINE POKER REP. (Feb. 15, 2019, 
8:34 AM), https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/35298/nh-lottery-doj-wire-act-lawsuit 
[https://perma.cc/J5P7-ML28]. 
22. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 157 (“The parties nevertheless disagree as to whether a declaratory 
judgment should be limited to the parties or have universal effect. The plaintiffs maintain that 
declaratory relief ‘necessarily extends beyond the [Commission] itself.’ The Government contends 
that any declaratory relief must apply only to the parties to the case. I agree with the Government.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
23. For instance, one common question is whether the intermediate routing of data that exceeds the 
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Supreme Court’s decision in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n,24 which opened the doors for states to begin legalizing sports 
wagering after more than two decades of prohibition, the interest in 
legalizing sports betting has never been higher.25 In the first year since the 
decision in Murphy, more than twenty states have introduced legislation 
to allow sports wagering within their borders; however, like an albatross 
around their necks, questions regarding just who is implicated and what 
activities are covered by the Wire Act are causing pause for states to 
legalize the most lucrative form of sports wagering, mobile wagering.26 
This Article addresses many of the key questions surrounding the scope 
of the Wire Act and the intent of the statute’s authors. It does so in five 
parts. Part I discusses the current status of the Wire Act and the history of 
efforts to overturn the 2011 Department of Justice opinion. Part II 
analyzes the legislative history of the Wire Act, and the many evolutions 
of the language in the act. Part III evaluates many of the most pressing 
questions surrounding the scope of the Wire Act including who is in the 
business of betting27 and where the statute’s safe harbor provision 
applies.28 Part IV deliberates the potential application to sub-segments of 
the sports betting industry that have largely avoided Wire Act scrutiny, 
namely the daily fantasy sports industry and those entities that sell data, 
which facilitates the operation of sportsbooks. Finally, Part V discusses 
some minor amendments that could better position the Wire Act for a 
world with expanding legal sports gambling. 
                                                   
jurisdiction of a state that allows mobile betting should trigger the Wire Act’s reach by being interstate 
in nature. See Robert Fisher & Christopher Queenin, High Wire Act: The DOJ Creates Uncertainty 
in the Budding Online Gambling Industry by Reversing Course on the Applicability of the Wire Act, 
NIXON PEABODY (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.nixonpeabody.com/en/ideas/articles/2019/02/04/high-
wire-act [https://perma.cc/Z9QM-FZDD]. 
24. 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).  
25. Id. at 1484–85. See also generally John T. Holden, Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on 
Sports Betting, 35 GA. ST. L. REV. 329 (2019) (discussing the evolution of the regulation of sports betting). 
26. See Steve Bittenbender, Tennessee Legislators Punt Online Sports Betting Bill, Cite Wire Act 
Questions, CASINO.ORG (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.casino.org/news/tennessee-legislators-punt-
on-online-sports-betting-bill [https://perma.cc/CED8-AZAN]. 
27. The Wire Act applies specifically to those “engaged in the business of betting or wagering.” 18 
U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018). 
28. The Wire Act exempts “the transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign country where betting on that sporting 
event or contest is legal into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.” Id. § 1084(b). 
However, it remains uncertain whether information that passes through a third state, where such 
information is illegal, violates the Wire Act. 
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I. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE WIRE ACT 
The federal government’s increased attention on sports gambling 
can be traced to the 1950s, with the establishment of the Kefauver 
Committee, which was tasked with investigating and providing 
recommendations to combat the perceived growth of organized crime.29 
In order to combat organized crime, the federal government sought to 
target the money-making businesses of organized crime.30 The Wire Act 
criminalized the transmission of wagering information across state lines 
by those in the business of betting.31 The simplicity of the statute’s text 
and the elements required for a Wire Act claim generated few challenges 
to the scope of the statute from the date of passage until the widespread 
availability of the internet, as most cases involved the placing of sports 
wagers via telephone.32 The Wire Act states as follows: 
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering 
knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the 
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers 
or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any 
sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire 
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or 
credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in 
the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.33 
The Wire Act targets two separate types of activities: (1) the 
transmission of information or communications for placing bets; and 
(2) the transmission of information for payment related to gambling.34 The 
specific application of the Wire Act to those in the business of betting, as 
opposed to casual gamblers, had indeed been one of the more complex 
questions regarding the Wire Act, until the internet era prompted novel 
questions to be raised.35 
                                                   
29. See generally WILLIAM H. MOORE, THE KEFAUVER COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME 
1950-1952 (1974); U.S. SENATE HISTORICAL OFFICE, A History of Notable Senate Investigations: 
Special Committee on Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, U.S. SENATE, 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Kefauver.htm 
[https://perma.cc/6MFG-WFN4]. 
30. See generally SCHWARTZ, supra note 2. 
31. The Interstate Wire Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. See id. 
35. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D.R.I. 1981). However, the outer limits of 
the business of betting qualification of the Wire Act have not been clarified. 
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A. In re Mastercard 
The modern questioning of the scope of the Wire Act likely originated 
around 1997, with the uncertainty as to whether websites that hosted 
online casinos implicated the Wire Act and the first hearings on internet 
gambling.36 These modern issues about the scope of the Wire Act would 
initially culminate in the 2001 case, In re Mastercard.37 In that case, the 
Eastern District Court of Louisiana was the first court to address the 
question of whether the Wire Act applied to activities other than sports 
betting.38 The case was consolidated in Louisiana’s Eastern District after 
Larry Thompson and Lawrence Bradley brought class actions against the 
major credit card networks, Visa and Mastercard, as well as several of 
their issuing banks, alleging that the companies were in violation of a 
variety of statutes, including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act for facilitating payments to online casinos that 
allowed for illegal gambling.39 
While these men were concerned citizens, they were also gamblers: 
Brady was charged more than $7,000 for his “purchases” at online 
casinos, and Thompson was charged $1,510 by Mastercard.40 The 
plaintiffs accused Visa and Mastercard of actively directing American 
customers to participate in and aid and abet offshore “bookmaking 
activities in the United States where they are not legal.”41 The court 
addressed a variety of claims raised by the plaintiffs in the credit card 
companies’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed to 
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.42 
Prior to dismissal, District Judge Duval addressed the Wire Act claims 
raised by the plaintiffs.43 Visa and Mastercard argued that the plaintiffs’ 
failure to allege that they wagered on sports was a “fatal defect” to their 
                                                   
36. See, e.g., The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., 
Terrorism, and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2–3 (1997). The Senate 
held a hearing and proposed legislation in order to clarify the Wire Act, stating that the statute applies 
to all forms of wagering, not simply sports wagering, but also that the statute incorporates the internet 
within its scope, a question that was uncertain at the time. See id. 
37. 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001). 
38. See Elizabeth A. Walsh, In re MasterCard International, Inc.: The Inapplicability of the Wire 
Act to Traditional Casino-Style Games, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 445, 447 (2002). 
39. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 473–74. 
40. Id. at 474 (noting that the plaintiffs’ complaints state that they were charged as though the 
casino transactions were purchases as opposed to cash advances). 
41. Id. at 475. 
42. Id. at 497. 
43. Id. at 479. 
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Wire Act claims.44 The district court held that “a plain reading of the 
statutory language clearly requires that the object of the gambling be a 
sporting event or contest. Both the rule and the exception to the rule 
expressly qualify the nature of the gambling activity as that related to a 
‘sporting event or contest.’”45 Providing more support for the court’s plain 
reading, the plaintiffs had apparently relied on the first clause of the 
statute, which directly included the sporting events or contests language.46 
Judge Duval cited the then-ongoing efforts by Congress to amend the 
Wire Act to incorporate non-sports-gambling activities within the scope 
of the statute, as well as the legislative history of the statute. In jettisoning 
the Wire Act claims, the district court stated that the “[p]laintiffs’ 
argument flies in the face of the clear wording of the Wire Act and is more 
appropriately directed to the legislative branch than th[e] Court.”47 The 
plaintiffs, however, were not inclined to support the new legislation and 
instead appealed the dismissal of their claims to the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.48 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was unanimous in upholding the lower 
court’s dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims.49 In addressing the 
plaintiffs’ claims using the Wire Act as a predicate offense to find a 
violation of the RICO Act, the Fifth Circuit panel said: “[w]e agree with 
the district court’s statutory interpretation, its reading of the relevant case 
law, its summary of the relevant legislative history, and its conclusion.”50 
The Fifth Circuit opinion in the In re Mastercard case remained the 
primary judicial guidance on the application of the Wire Act in the 
internet-era;51 however, questions remained about which clauses of the 
Act applied only to sporting events, especially as states began to explore 
the prospect of online lottery sales.52 
                                                   
44. Id. at 480. 
45. Id. at 480. 
46. United States v. Lombardo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1279–80 (D. Utah 2007) (noting that the In re 
Mastercard Court’s analysis was not actually necessary to its determination of the defendants’ motions as 
the defendants did appear to engage in some conduct that would still implicate the Wire Act). 
47. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 481. Indeed, Judge Duval’s statement is perhaps 
more pertinent now than in 2001 given the recent efforts by the executive branch to re-write the scope 
of the statute via an Office of Legal Counsel memo. See infra section I.E. 
48. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002). 
49. Id. at 264. 
50. Id. at 262–64. 
51. Id. at 264. A prior case had concluded that information associated with sports wagers was a 
required element for a Wire Act claim, though prior to widely available internet access. See United 
States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1973). 
52. See generally SEITZ MEMO, supra note 15. 
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B. The 2011 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum 
In a memorandum dated September 20, 2011, the Office of Legal 
Counsel, an office of the Department of Justice that opines on legal 
questions, issued an opinion on the scope of the Wire Act and its potential 
application to the use of the internet to sell lottery tickets to in-state adults 
using out-of-state transaction processors.53 The author of the 
memorandum, Assistant Attorney General Virginia Seitz, begins by 
noting that it is the Office of Legal Counsel’s conclusion that “interstate 
transmissions of wire communications that do not relate to a ‘sporting 
event or contest,’ fall outside of the reach of the Wire Act.”54 The impetus 
for the opinion was that Illinois and New York desired to sell lottery 
tickets online, but concerns arose over the interstate routing of transaction 
data.55 While the states concluded that the action would not offend the 
Wire Act, the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division referred the 
matter to the Office of Legal Counsel for an opinion on the matter.56 
Secondary concerns were also raised as to whether the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)57 may permit criminal 
conduct that the Wire Act prohibits.58 
The Seitz memorandum notes that while there is “sparse case law” 
addressing the Wire Act’s scope, with cases construing the statute both 
narrowly and broadly, the statute should only be applied to the 
“transmission of communications related to bets or wagers on sporting 
events or contests.”59 The Seitz memorandum divides the Wire Act into 
two broad clauses. The first clause prohibits: 
[A]nyone engaged in the business of betting or wagering from 
knowingly using a wire communication facility ‘for the 
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers 
or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any 
sporting event or contest.60 
The second clause prohibits a person from knowingly utilizing a wire 
facility to transmit information that “entitle[s] the recipient to ‘receive 
money or credit’ either ‘as a result of bets or wagers’ or ‘for information 
                                                   
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1 (internal citations omitted). 
55. Id. at 1–2. 
56. Id. at 3. 
57. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2018). 
58. Id. at 2–3. 
59. Id. at 3–4. 
60. Id. at 4. 
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assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.’”61 The question for the Office 
of Legal Counsel to resolve was whether the “sporting event or contest” 
requirement applied only to the second part of the first clause or if the 
requirement ran through the entirety of the two clauses.62 
The Seitz memorandum concluded that the most plausible reading of 
the statute was that the “sporting event or contest” language modified the 
transmission language.63 A broader reading of the scope of the prohibition 
would raise serious questions as to why Congress included the “sporting 
event or contest” language if it intended to prohibit all bets or wagers 
otherwise within the scope of the statute’s language.64 Similarly, it was a 
logical interpretation that Congress would desire the two clauses to have 
a “parallel” scope and for both to be restricted to betting or wagering 
associated with “sports event[s] or contest[s].”65 
The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum then examines the Wire 
Act’s legislative history, seeking to determine the intentions of Congress 
fifty years prior.66 The Office of Legal Counsel memorandum highlighted 
the comma placement in an earlier version of the bill.67 The comma 
placement made clear that the sporting event phrase modified both the 
“bets or wagers” phrase and the “information assisting in the placing of 
bets or wagers.”68 The commas were removed when the class of 
individuals targeted by the statute changed to those involved in gambling 
businesses.69 However, nothing in the subsequent legislative history 
suggested an intent to redefine the rest of the scope of the statute.70 
While the phrase “sporting event or contest” is not present in the Wire 
Act’s second clause, the memorandum concludes that the reliance on 
“bets or wagers” is a shorthand reference to the entire phrase in clause 
one, which includes the “sporting event or contest” language.71 The 
conclusion that the Office of Legal Counsel reached was that it was 
“Congress’s overriding goal in the Act to stop the use of wire 
communications for sports gambling in particular.”72 As further evidence 
                                                   
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 5. 
63. Id. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 6. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 7. 
72. Id. at 8. 
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that Congress specifically included sports betting within the Wire Act to 
the exclusion of other gambling activities, the memorandum cites the 
Wagering Paraphernalia Act, enacted the same year as the Wire Act, 
which enumerates a number of gambling activities covered and 
distinguishes these activities from the conduct in the Wire Act.73 Despite 
the 2011 memorandum, the limitation of the Wire Act to “sporting events 
or contests” would be questioned a short time later in 2015, as members 
of Congress would first seek to legislate on the scope of the Wire Act.74 
C. Restoration of America’s Wire Act 
The period after the 2011 Wire Act opinion left some members of 
Congress feeling that the Wire Act had been misinterpreted by a 
“misguided,” partisan Justice Department.75 Despite allegations that the 
2011 memorandum was partisan, both political parties supported a 
legislative dismantling of the opinion, with Republican Lindsey Graham 
and Democrat Dianne Feinstein championing the bill, Restoration of 
America’s Wire Act (RAWA).76 Congress aimed to modernize the Wire 
Act’s scope to ban not only sports wagering but virtually all forms of 
online gambling.77 The purported driving force behind RAWA was not 
the Senators who introduced the bill, but Las Vegas Sands Corporation 
and casino magnate Sheldon Adelson, who has long opposed online 
gambling as a threat to his casino business.78 Several early efforts were 
made to introduce RAWA legislation, with each failing to reach major 
milestones in the congressional process.79 
D. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n 
As Congress questioned new Justice Department appointees about 
whether the Wire Act opinion should be revisited, New Jersey was 
challenging the constitutionality of a partial ban on states’ ability to 
                                                   
73. Id. at 11. 
74. See Restoration of America’s Wire Act, H.R. 707, 114th Cong. (2015). 
75. See Press Release, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Graham Statement on Justice 
Department’s Restoration of Wire Act (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/r
eleases/graham-statement-on-justice-departments-restoration-of-wire-act [https://perma.cc/G5KZ-
Z3YG] (blaming the Wire Act opinion on the Obama Administration’s Justice Department). 
76. See id.; Restoration of America’s Wire Act, H.R. 707, 114th Cong. (2015). 
77. See Chris Grove, The Restoration of America’s Wire Act—Inside the Proposed Ban on 
Regulated Online Gaming, ONLINE POKER REP. (Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.onlinepokerreport.co
m/11725/graham-chaffetz-introduce-anti-online-gambling-bill [https://perma.cc/67F6-SS9G]. 
78. See id. (reporting that early drafts of RAWA, originally titled the Internet Gambling Control 
Act, identified it as originating from Adelson lobbyists).  
79. Id. 
 
08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:47 PM 
688 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:677 
 
authorize sports wagering.80 The Murphy case challenged Congress’s 
ability to stop state legislators from both passing new legislation and 
repealing existing legislation.81 In 1992, Congress passed the Professional 
and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA).82 Whereas the Wire Act 
relied on the Commerce Clause to prohibit gambling that crosses state 
lines,83 the PASPA filled the gap that the Wire Act left unregulated—it 
directly banned states from authorizing new sports wagering schemes 
even if the transactions remained entirely within state lines.84 New Jersey 
initially challenged the law by attempting to pass a law authorizing sports 
wagering, but was rebuffed by the Third Circuit.85 The state then 
attempted to partially repeal its laws banning sports gambling, which led 
to the Supreme Court granting review.86 
The Supreme Court found that by restricting the state’s ability to repeal 
laws that it had previously passed, Congress violated the anti-
commandeering principle and intruded into New Jersey’s sovereign 
jurisdiction.87 While Justice Alito held that Congress had the power to ban 
sports wagering in totem, he said it could not dictate that state legislators 
do so on behalf of Congress.88 The finding that PASPA was 
unconstitutional opened the door for states across the country to begin 
passing laws legalizing sports wagering, and to begin competing with 
Nevada—a state that had held a virtual monopoly on legal sportsbook 
style betting since 1992.89 Even prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, 
states began preparing for a future date that would allow them to offer 
                                                   
80. See John T. Holden, Regulating Sports Wagering, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3370584 [https://perma.cc/ZVV2-DGNT]. 
More specifically, New Jersey argued that the PASPA unconstitutionally commandeered the state 
legislature to maintain a ban on sports wagering that the state no longer desired. The State argued that 
this requirement imposed by the PASPA was not a valid preemption exercise by the federal 
government and was incompatible with the Supreme Court’s decisions in New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass’n v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 499–506 (D. N.J. 2014). 
81. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1471 (2018). 
82. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3704 (1992). 
83. The PASPA was also passed as Commerce Clause legislation, as it was suggested that intrastate 
gambling had an impact on interstate commerce. See Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act–Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 13–14 (1992). 
84. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty 
Problem, 67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2017) (discussing the potential equal sovereignty problems with 
sports betting regulations). 
85. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 214–15 (3d Cir. 2013). 
86. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1471–73.  
87. Id. at 1481–82. 
88. Id. 
89. See Holden, supra note 80, at 7–9. 
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sports wagering, either as a result of a Supreme Court decision or 
congressional repeal.90 The Murphy decision, however, has catalyzed the 
movement of states seeking to legalize sports wagering, with more than 
thirty introducing legislation since the beginning of 2018;91 and 
accompanying many of these bills has been the desire to include mobile 
betting. The rise in sports betting legislation and general discussion of 
increasing access to gambling generally was met with a new 
memorandum from the Office of Legal Counsel, reversing the 
2011 opinion.92 
E. The 2018 Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum 
Years after RAWA was first introduced, the Wire Act was ascribed 
new meaning.93 In November 2018, the Justice Department issued its 
latest memorandum on the subject, Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act 
Applies to Non-Sports Gambling.94 The memorandum, authored by the 
Office of Legal Counsel’s Assistant Attorney General Steven A. Engel, 
enabled the executive branch to accomplish what the legislative branch 
had failed to do.95 The twenty-three-page memorandum explains that the 
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice asked for the Office of 
Legal Counsel to reconsider the 2011 opinion, as it purportedly 
represented a departure from the Department’s previous prosecutorial 
policy.96 The memorandum concluded that all but one of the Wire Act’s 
prohibitions bars conduct beyond sports wagering.97 
The 2018 memorandum concluded that the 2011 opinion erred in 
reading the “sporting event or contest” to run through both clauses in their 
entirety, which was a departure from the prosecutorial approach that was 
                                                   
90. Id. 
91. Dustin Gouker, Legislative Tracker: Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS REP., 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker [https://perma.cc/VE9N-DGBZ] (last 
updated Jan. 11, 2020). 
92. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16; Dustin Gouker, Department of Justice Reverses Wire Act Opinion 
that Said Law is Limited to Sports Betting, ONLINE POKER REP. (Jan. 21, 2019, 3:31 PM), 
https://www.onlinepokerreport.com/34391/doj-new-wire-act-opinion [https://perma.cc/3X22-8NTX]. 
93. Tom Hamburger, Matt Zapotosky & Josh Dawsey, Justice Department Issues New Opinion 
that Could Further Restrict Online Gambling, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2019, 7:47 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/justice-department-issues-new-opinion-that-could-
further-restrict-online-gambling/2019/01/14/a501e2da-1857-11e9-8813-
cb9dec761e73_story.html?utm_term=.1118271998cc [https://perma.cc/JV9R-UH2X]. 
94. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16. 
95. Id. at 1–2. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 2. 
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taken prior to the 2011 opinion.98 Successful prosecutions for activities 
beyond sports gambling were cited as a basis for asserting a broad scope 
of the Wire Act in the 2018 memorandum, in addition to a challenge to 
the 2011 opinion regarding the ambiguity of the statute.99 The second 
memorandum relied on “[t]raditional canons of statutory construction” to 
determine the following: “[i]n construing the reach of modifiers like ‘on 
any sporting event or contest,’ the default rule is that ‘a limiting clause or 
phrase . . . should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase 
that it immediately follows.’”100 The grammatical structure and placement 
of the commas led the 2018 memorandum to conclude that the first clause 
prohibits sports wagering via its second prohibition, but its first 
prohibition is not so limited and incorporates additional activities.101 
The Wire Act’s second clause, which lacks a reference to sports 
gambling, was thus reinterpreted in 2018 to apply to a variety of forms of 
gambling. There was no necessity to interpret the “sporting event or 
contest,” modifier as running parallel through both clauses.102 Relying 
again on Lockhart, the 2018 memorandum concluded in regards to the 
second clause that it would be structurally inappropriate to extend the 
“sporting event or contest” language at the end of the first clause forward 
through the entirety of the first clause and down through the entirety of 
the second clause where the language does not appear.103 The 
memorandum opined on the scope of the prohibition by stating the 
following: “[i]n sum, the linguistic maneuvers that are necessary to 
conclude that the sports-gambling modifier sweeps both backwards and 
forwards to reach all four of section 1084(a)’s prohibitions are too much 
for the statutory text to bear.”104 
In justifying an application of the “statute as written,” the memorandum 
concluded that the application of “sporting event or contest” lacked the 
“patent absurdity” necessary to conduct an investigation beyond the 
text.105 The 2018 memorandum concluded it was improbable that 
Congress would have not wanted to include bets and wagers in non-
sporting events as well.106 The 2018 memorandum dismisses the Seitz 
memorandum’s analysis that when Congress revised the statute, it 
                                                   
98. Id. at 11. 
99. Id. at 4–7. 
100. Id. at 7 (citing Lockhart v. United States, 577 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 958, 962 (2016)). 
101. Id. at 10–11. 
102. Id. at 11. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 13–14. 
105. Id. at 14. 
106. Id. at 10–11. 
 
08 Holden.docx (Do Not Delete) 5/30/20  11:47 PM 
2020] THROUGH THE WIRE ACT 691 
 
intended only to modify the language regarding which enterprises were 
incorporated, and not the wholesale expansion of the statute.107 In addition 
to its new conclusions regarding the scope of the Wire Act, the Office of 
Legal Counsel also opined on the interaction between the Wire Act and 
the UIGEA, an issue that the Seitz memorandum determined was mooted 
by the opinion on the Wire Act’s scope.108 The memorandum determined 
that the UIGEA is not impacted by the Wire Act, and vice versa.109 This 
new Wire Act interpretation was met with surprise and exasperation in 
many parts of the country that had relied on the 2011 opinion to offer 
various forms of online gambling that in one respect or another relied on 
interstate transmissions. As a result, the Justice Department implemented 
a ninety-day compliance period.110 
F. The New Hampshire Case 
The New Hampshire Lottery Commission quickly filed suit, 
challenging the new Department of Justice conclusion that the Wire Act 
applies more broadly than to sports gambling alone.111 The new 
interpretation sparked concerns from lotteries who offered online sales, as 
well as gaming companies who offered intrastate betting, and relied on 
the UIGEA’s determination regarding interstate intermediate routing to 
offer online gaming, as such activities may implicate the new scope of the 
Wire Act.112 Joining the lawsuit was NeoPollard Interactive, a lottery 
provider that hired the same legal team that had prevailed in May 2018 at 
the Supreme Court in the Murphy case.113 
                                                   
107. Id. at 16. 
108. Id. at 17–18. 
109. Id. at 18. 
110. See DAG Wire Act Letter, supra note 20. 
111. See N.H. Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019); Ramsey, supra note 21. 
112. Ramsey, supra note 21; Christine Swanick, DOJ Opinion Leaves Industry Hanging: If UIGEA 
Exclusions Don’t Modify the Wire Act What Does that Mean for Intrastate Gambling 
Transactions?, L. LEVEL (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.lawofthelevel.com/2019/01/articles/gambling
/uigea-exclusions-dont-modify-wire-act/ [https://perma.cc/D84Z-EEQE]. 
113. C. Ryan Barber, Gibson Dunn Team Sues Justice Department Over Reversal on Online 
Gaming, LAW.COM (Feb. 16, 2019, 11:21 AM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2019/02/16/gi
bson-dunn-team-sues-justice-department-over-reversal-on-online-gambling [https://perma.cc/5MBY-
KRRD]; Michael Casey, Judge Gives Justice Department a Deadline in 
N.H. Lottery Case, CONCORD MONITOR (Apr. 12, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Ju
dge-gives-Justice-Department-a-deadline-in-lottery-case-24816229 [https://perma.cc/Y79E-CX6H]. In 
perhaps a soothsaying moment, Judge Barbadoro noted that regardless of the outcome of the district court 
case, the scope of the Wire Act appeared destined for the Supreme Court. See John Brennan, New 
Hampshire Judge: The Wire Act Covers Only Sports Betting, US BETS (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.usbets.com/new-hampshire-wire-act-sports-betting-ruling [https://perma.cc/K46K-QV8Z]. 
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On June 3, 2019, Judge Barbadoro ruled that section 1084(a) of the 
Wire Act “applies only to transmissions related to bets or wagers on a 
sporting event or contest. The 2018 [Office of Legal Counsel] Opinion is 
set aside.”114 The first challenge the plaintiffs faced was establishing that 
they had standing, as there had not been any actual enforcement actions 
taken against non-sports gambling operators under the new opinion, let 
alone the plaintiffs. Judge Barbadoro found that the threat faced by the 
plaintiffs was concrete and particularized enough that they had 
standing.115 Judge Barbadoro further held that the 2018 memorandum was 
sufficiently final to merit judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act and that the 2018 memorandum read ambiguity into the 
Wire Act that was not present in order to justify the most 
recent  interpretation.116 
The decision from the New Hampshire District Court appeared to be 
conclusive, but Judge Barbadoro was very careful to note that the decision 
was limited to the plaintiffs and was not a sweeping nationwide 
injunction.117 The decision has left the door open, not only for an appeal 
by the Department of Justice, but also for other states to challenge the 
New Hampshire District Court’s decision in other federal district courts. 
The decision, which put the plaintiffs under the auspices of the 2011 
memorandum, remains a very limited ruling in terms of its practical 
implications. One of the questions that remains is: what exactly was the 
Wire Act intended to cover? In Part II, this Article examines the 
legislative history of the Wire Act. 
II. THE WIRE ACT’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The Wire Act’s history has been the subject of much debate in recent 
years.118 But, prior to 2011, the Wire Act existed for almost fifty years 
with little controversy. The statute was used largely to target interstate 
                                                   
114. Barr, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 160. 
115. Id. at 142–44 (“After operating for years in reliance on OLC guidance that their conduct was not 
subject to the Wire Act, the plaintiffs have had to confront a sudden about-face by the Department of Justice. 
Even worse, they face a directive from the Deputy Attorney General to his prosecutors that they should 
begin enforcing the OLC’s new interpretation of the Act after the expiration of a specified grace period. 
Given these unusual circumstances, the plaintiffs have met their burden to establish their standing to sue.”). 
116. Id. at 145–52. 
117. Id. at 157–59. Judge Barbadaro justified the limited scope of the injunction by stating 
“[d]eclaratory judgments do not bind non-parties. The Act allows me to ‘declare the rights and other legal 
relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.’ It thus limits me to declaring the rights and legal 
relations of the plaintiffs seeking the declaration.” Id. at 157 (internal citations omitted). 
118. See e.g., James Trusty & Andrew Silver, DOJ High-Wire Act, IFRAH L. (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.ifrahlaw.com/ifrah-on-igaming/doj-high-wire-act/ [https://perma.cc/XYZ9-8S44]. 
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bookmaking operations with little fanfare for much of that period.119 Two 
events brought the Wire Act’s scope into question: first, the arrival of the 
internet; and second, the wide-spread expansion of state-sponsored 
gambling—two things that the authors of the Wire Act likely never even 
contemplated. 
The Wire Act originated out of the Kefauver Committee, led by 
Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver.120 The Kefauver Committee spent the 
early part of the 1950s travelling the United States and holding hearings 
in fourteen cities over two years to determine the scope of organized 
crime’s grasp.121 The Kefauver Committee returned a series of 
recommendations for new legislation, none of which were immediately 
adopted.122 It was not until 1961 that Congress would act on one of 
Kefauver’s recommendations by passing the Wire Act.123 The Kefauver 
Committee prompted more than a decade of hearings aimed at targeting 
organized crime’s money-making businesses.124 
The period between the 1940s and the 1960s in America saw a shift in 
community perceptions of crime.125 Chief among this societal change was 
the perception of gambling, as it transitioned from being viewed as a local 
matter to a national matter.126 During this period, there were early attempts 
by law enforcement agencies to establish estimates of the size of the 
illegal gambling market.127 Government officials noted that the illegal 
gambling market was run by two syndicates: one controlling the slot 
machine and related activities market; and the other controlling the 
race  wire.128 
The race wire, or “racing wire,” was a high-speed service that 
disseminated information on gambling contests to “racing rooms” and 
individual bookmakers across the country.129 The speed of the wire 
                                                   
119. See, e.g., John Holden, What We Can Learn from Ted Olson’s History With The Wire Act, 
LEGAL SPORTS REP. (June 19, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32826/holden-wire-act-ted-
olson/[https://perma.cc/U8XK-LCC7] (discussing the application of the statute against offshore 
bookmakers targeting U.S.-based consumers). 
120. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 71. 
121. See id.  
122. Id. at 72–73. 
123. Id. at 78–79, 105. 
124. See John Holden, Legislative Sausage Making: How We Got The Wire Act, Part Two, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (Sept. 11, 2018, 12:17 PM), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/22329/making-the-
wire-act-sports-betting-part-two [https://perma.cc/A8A5-JQLA]. 
125. SCHWARTZ, supra note 2, at 45.  
126. Id. at 45.  
127. Id. at 48. 
128. Id. 
129. See Note, Racing Wire Service, 5 STAN. L. REV. 493, 493–95 (1953). 
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service was the factor that enabled subscribing bookmakers to be 
profitable.130 A bookmaker who did not subscribe to the wire service 
might lose out to a customer who had access to live data regarding race 
winners.131 Missouri Attorney General J.E. Taylor said that the racing 
wire was a relatively unknown service outside of those familiar with 
gambling.132 Despite the relative obscurity of the racing wire, several 
states began to take steps to regulate race wires during the 1940s, and 
Congress held hearings over eleven days in April and May of 1950.133 On 
April 4, 1950, Senator Johnson of Colorado told his Senate colleagues, 
“[g]ambling information ought to be restricted but there is a border line 
between gambling information and legitimate news.”134 The concern with 
the overlap between gambling information and reporting information was 
something that would permeate the congressional hearings that would 
precede the passage of the Wire Act. 
A. Transmission of Wagering Information–1950 
The initial 1950 hearing on the Transmission of Wagering Information 
revealed several key themes. First, there were concerns regarding 
boundaries of state and federal jurisdiction, and to what extent gambling 
was a local issue versus a national issue. The second theme that emerged 
centered on the emphasis on horse racing that Congress sought to 
examine, but it appeared that betting on team sports was a much greater 
market. Third, providers of wire services expressed concern that the 
proposed bill, as written, might require the services to monitor the actions 
of their customers, even when the providers were merely making 
information available. 
The first Senate hearing regarding criminalizing the transmission of 
wagering information heard testimony, or received correspondence, from 
more than sixty witnesses.135 Those who testified can be categorized into 
four groups: state and local officials, federal officials, media and wire 
service operators, and bookmakers.136 The testimony at the hearing 
revealed that the wire services were of far greater importance to 
                                                   
130. Id. at 495. 
131. Id. 
132. See J.E. Taylor, The Transmission of Racing Information by Wire in Missouri, 17 MO. L. REV. 
16, 16 (1952). 
133. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S. 3358 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. (1950); Note, Racing Wire Service, supra note 129, at 498. 
134. 96 CONG. REC. 4639 (1950) (statement of Sen. Johnson). 
135. Transmission of Gambling Information, supra note 133, at III–IV. 
136. Id. 
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bookmakers than horse racing alone. The New York Times makes 
reference to the testimony of Wayne Coy, chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), noting that Mr. Coy was concerned 
about the burden of having enforcement placed on the FCC as opposed to 
a federal law enforcement agency.137 The article also noted that Senator 
Capehart remained unconvinced that local officials required federal 
assistance to curb gambling.138 Perhaps in the interest of presenting both 
sides of the argument, the article quoted alleged underworld figure Frank 
Costello, who denied involvement with bookmaking but noted that he 
considered bookmakers “no more detrimental to society than a stock 
broker, and that liquor was probably more harmful to more people 
than  gambling.”139 
The first hearings that took place regarding the transmission of 
gambling information began on April 17, 1950, before the Senate 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.140 
The committee heard testimony from more than sixty witnesses, received 
written statements from eight organizations, and received letters from half 
of the country’s state attorneys general.141 The impetus for the 
congressional hearing was the Attorney General’s conference, which took 
place in February of 1950.142 The conference culminated in a resolution 
stating: “[b]e it resolved, That this conference go on record as favoring 
Federal legislation making Interstate use of telephone, telegraph, or radio 
facilities for dissemination of horse race results for illegal gambling 
purposes a Federal crime.”143 Following the resolution, the conference 
attendees made clear that their recommendation excluded the common 
dissemination of sports information through press associations 
and  newspapers.144 
The state attorneys general present at the 1950 conference further noted 
that “organized gambling” on baseball, football, and basketball games 
made prominent use of interstate communication facilities for carrying on 
its transactions.145 U.S. Attorney General J. Howard McGrath opened the 
                                                   
137. Harold B. Hinton, Coy Urges Ban on Transmission of Racing Data, Even for Papers, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 25, 1950, at 1. 
138. Id. 
139. Harold B. Hinton, No Laws Can Halt Gambling, Costello Tells Senate Body: Says He is Not 
Qualified to Testify on Gambling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 1950, at 1. 
140. See generally Transmission of Gambling Information, supra note 133. 
141. See id. at III, IV. 
142. Id. at 3. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
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hearing before the subcommittee by stating that gambling “cannot operate 
on its present gigantic scale without corrupting what it touches.”146 In 
emphasizing the importance of having a clear federal policy for restricting 
the transmission of wagering information, McGrath further acknowledged 
that the regulation of gambling had traditionally been left to the state.147 
The attorney general for Nevada, Alan H. Bible, observed that 
gambling enterprises are primarily local in nature, and differences in state 
law may obscure the ability to regulate gambling on a national level.148 As 
a result, Bible advocated that federal gambling law should serve an 
ancillary role to assist states in enforcing their own laws.149 The Nevada 
attorney general further argued that any federal regulation prohibiting 
transmission of wagering information in interstate commerce should 
exempt states that permit the practice.150 
John P. McGrath, spokesman for the National Institute of Municipal 
Law Offices (NIMLO), cited the findings of a California public utilities 
commission hearing that determined that the citizens of the state do not 
have an inherent right to utility services, including the telephone, and that 
these services therefore may be withheld on the basis that they are being 
used in conjunction with illegal activity.151 A discussion between Mayor 
Newton of Denver and Senator Capehart revealed the challenge in 
negotiating the competing interests of state and local governments and the 
federal government.152 Senator Capehart proposed a hypothetical ban on 
parimutuel wagering in the states as a means to curb illegal wagering and 
inquired if Newton would be in favor of a ban, and Mayor Newton 
responded that he would not support such a ban.153 Instead, Newton was 
determined that the federal government should be primarily concerned 
with drafting and passing legislation that would break up interstate 
organized crime syndicates.154 
The testimony of Herzel Plaine of the Solicitor General’s Office within 
the Department of Justice estimated that there may have been as many as 
150,000 bookmakers operating in the country during World War II.155 
                                                   
146. Id. at 11 (testimony of J. Howard McGrath). 
147. Id. at 12. 
148. Id. at 15 (testimony of Alan H. Bible). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. at 19 (testimony of John P. McGrath). 
152. Id. at 69–70. 
153. Id. at 70. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 77 (testimony of Herzel Plaine). 
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When asked whether he believed that there was an organized nationwide 
syndicate of 150,000 bookmakers, Assistant Attorney General James M. 
McInerney said that there is “no evidence which indicates that there is 
such an organized criminal syndicate.”156 McInerney further noted that, in 
his estimation, federal crime appeared to be decreasing and there was little 
support for the contention that there was a nationwide increase in 
organized criminal activity.157 McInerney also elucidated that state and 
local governments have failed to eradicate bookmakers for two principal 
reasons: first, state police forces lack the manpower, and second, 
bookmaking has a reputation as a victimless crime.158 
Arizona Senator McFarland, in questioning Assistant Attorney General 
McInerney, inquired as to whether Congress should also prohibit 
dissemination of gambling information via the mail.159 McInerney 
responded that banning dissemination of gambling materials through the 
mail would be a further hindrance to bookmakers, but it may be more 
prudent to simply ban the dissemination of gambling materials in 
interstate commerce.160 McInerney further detailed that the race wire 
operators collect their information for dissemination by placing agents at 
racetracks who then transmit the real-time information back to the wire 
service for dissemination, either with authorization of the tracks or in 
secret without authorization.161 
Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro of Baltimore, when asked whether horse 
racing should be banned because it provides an environment that promotes 
gambling, responded that it should not because the prospect of presenting 
a similar argument for sports such as baseball or basketball would not 
garner support.162 Mayor D’Alesandro further noted to Wyoming Senator 
Lester Hunt that the proposed bill would likely not encapsulate betting on 
baseball or other sports; instead, it would only apply to horse racing.163 
While supporting the proposed legislation, Mayor D’Alesandro noted that 
he had not seen evidence of a nationwide crime syndicate operating within 
the city of Baltimore.164 
                                                   
156. Id. at 77–78 (testimony of James M. McInerney). 
157. Id. 
158. See id. at 81. 
159. Id. at 87. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 88. 
162. Id. at 113 (testimony of Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr.). 
163. Id. at 115. 
164. Id. at 116–17. 
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Nathanial Goldstick, counsel for the city of Detroit, testified that the 
city had managed to eliminate traditional cigar store front bookmakers, 
but that these had been replaced by “vest-pocket handbook operators,” 
who are essentially a mobile form of bookmakers.165 Goldstick testified 
that it was his belief that a federal law criminalizing the transmission of 
wagering information could eliminate the business model used by 
bookmakers.166 In a discussion between Goldstick and Senator Capehart 
of Indiana, a further challenge to implementation of the proposed bill was 
identified when it was noted that the federal government would be 
unlikely to provide investigative services to local or state 
law enforcement.167 
The 1950 hearing that surrounded the first iteration of legislation that 
would eventually become the 1961 Wire Act was focused on the theme of 
separation of powers between state and federal governments. While state 
and municipal authorities welcomed federal assistance, they also stressed 
that these bookmakers, in their estimation, were primarily local 
operations. The inquiry as to whether there was a national gambling 
syndicate was countered by representatives of various federal and state 
agencies and governments that appeared to have little information that 
would support such a finding, in stark contravention to the impetus for 
convening the initial hearing.168 
The focus of the 1950 discussion was on the transmission of horse 
racing information, and there was a consistent attempt by members of the 
Senate to inquire as to the scope of wagering on professional sports. For 
instance, Western Union provided a ticker service that furnished inning 
by inning scores, which facilitated information to bookmakers to operate 
with up to the minute information.169 While the availability of play-by-
play baseball information was noted to be important for bookmakers, 
Thomas McElroy, assistant attorney general of Texas, stated that he did 
not believe it was necessary to include play-by-play baseball information 
within the scope of the statute.170 
Wayne Coy of the FCC noted that at the time basketball and football 
games had what were perceived to be centrally created odds that were 
produced and transmitted in advance.171 However, according to his 
                                                   
165. Id. at 155 (testimony of Nathanial Goldstick). 
166. Id. at 155–56. 
167. Id. at 180–81. 
168. See, e.g., id. at 115–16 (testimony of Mayor D’Alesandro) (discussing the lack of support he 
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169. Id. at 93 (testimony of James M. McInerney). 
170. Id. at 321 (testimony of Thomas McElroy). 
171. Id. at 327 (testimony of Wayne Coy). 
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testimony, a great deal of betting on baseball took place during the game, 
and odds could fluctuate on a play-by-play basis.172 Coy advocated for the 
interest of completeness, but noted the difficulties of crafting a bill to 
cover all “information assisting in the placing of bets,” because it could 
effectively cover “all information concerning baseball games.”173 
Russell Brophy, a Los Angeles-based bookmaker, articulated that 
Congress faced a challenge in attempting to regulate what activities the 
proposed ban would apply to.174 A bookmaker will take a bet on “anything 
that the public would be interested in,” according to Brophy’s 
testimony.175 Brophy further informed the Senate subcommittee that 
stopping the racing wire would not stop people from gambling.176 Brophy 
expressed that the business of bookmaking on baseball far surpasses the 
off-track-betting business.177 The frequency of baseball games provides 
an attractive feature for both bookmakers and bettors.178 
Walter Semingsen of Western Union stated that the company’s 
commercial news department provided sports scores through various 
ticker services, noting that the company had a history of assisting law 
enforcement, and that the company did not provide gambling information, 
such as live odds.179 As a result of the perceived burden that would be 
presented by requiring Western Union to know what business its 
customers were in before providing its service, it was proposed that 
common carriers should be exempt for the scope of the statute.180 
Semingsen further attempted to distance Western Union’s service from 
other race wires by noting that all the baseball information was gathered 
by Western Union, operating under contract with the various baseball 
leagues.181 Samuel Perlman noted that criminalizing the publication of 
specific aspects of sporting events, such as live scores or horse racing 
results, would simply create a monopoly for bookmakers who are already 
operating illegally, as they would find a means to gather 
the information.182 
                                                   
172. Id. at 327–28. 
173. Id. at 328. 
174. Id. at 498 (testimony of Russell Brophy). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 499. 
177. Id. at 506. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 598–99 (testimony of Walter Semingsen). 
180. Id. at 604. 
181. Id. at 628. 
182. Id. at 709 (testimony of J. Samuel Perlman). 
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B. Anticrime Legislation–1951 
The second Senate hearing to take place with regards to legislation that 
would become the Wire Act took place over September 19, 20, and 21, 
1951.183 The Anticrime Legislation hearings of 1951 contained four 
separate, but related, gambling bills.184 Herzel E. Plaine, special assistant 
to the attorney general, testified that the new proposed bill, Senate Bill 
1563, presented an improvement over the bill debated in 1950, because it 
now contained a licensing provision.185 By incorporating a licensing 
provision that would be administered by the FCC, the federal government 
could delineate wire services used for legitimate activities from wire 
services utilized primarily for bookmaking because the bookmaking wire 
services would be unable to meet the burden of licensure.186 Plaine further 
explained that it was the position of his office that requiring licenses for 
wire services would not run afoul of the First Amendment protections 
granted to speech or the press, and as an added security, newspapers were 
exempted from the scope of the legislation.187 
Proposed Senate Bill 1564, the one of the four that was a direct 
predecessor to the Wire Act, also contained a provision that would create 
a separate offense for any individual who “surreptitiously” obtained and 
transmitted gambling information regarding horse or dog racing or 
sporting events without the permission of the venue operator.188 Plaine 
made efforts to articulate that the Department of Justice was not 
attempting to limit the dissemination of the information itself, but instead 
the agency was trying to limit individuals who used the information for 
gambling purposes.189 Assistant Attorney General Raymond Whearty 
testified that it would be beneficial if the proposed laws contained broader 
language, arguing that the term “gambling enterprise” should be included 
so that it would be clear that organized entities were the target.190 While 
Whearty testified that the Department of Justice did not have an objection 
to the bill, he noted that questions remained within the Department 
                                                   
183. See Anticrime Legislation: Hearing on S. 1563, S. 1564, S. 1624 & S. 2116 Before the S. 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong. (1951). 
184. Id. 
185. Id. at 8 (testimony of Herzel E. Plaine). 
186. Id. at 9.  
187. Id. at 9. 
188. Id. at 12. 
189. Id. at 17. 
190. Id. at 22 (testimony of Raymond P. Whearty). 
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whether there was a conflict of federal regulation infringing on an area of 
state concern.191 
Wayne Coy, chairman of the FCC, testified that the prohibitions 
contained within the proposed bills were within the domain of federal 
jurisdiction and did not intrude on state sovereignty.192 In his testimony, 
Coy identified further problems in the proposed bill, including the lack of 
definition exempting “newspapers of general circulation,” a term Coy 
believed would be exploited by the very bookmakers engaged in the 
behavior the bill sought to stamp out.193 
Spencer J. Drayton, executive secretary for the Thoroughbred Racing 
Associations of the United States, testified that the organization’s Code of 
Standards prohibited wire-services from disseminating directly or 
indirectly to illegal bookmakers.194 Drayton supported the position that 
bookmaking was a local issue, but argued that the “bookmakers’ wire 
service” was a monopolistic enterprise that had a “corrupting influence in 
all sports today.”195 While Drayton noted his opinion that federal 
intervention might be necessary in order to curb some aspects of the 
gambling wire service, he questioned whether the language might extend 
too far and ban activities that were legal and regulated in a variety 
of  states.196 
Walter Semingsen, Assistant Vice President of Western Union, 
testified before the Senate Committee that the “furnishing or receiving of 
racing news” is no more similar to gambling than the publication of racing 
news in daily newspapers or on television.197 Semingsen testified that it 
was Western Union’s position that the proposed bills put an undue burden 
on common carriers to investigate what activities their customers intended 
to utilize their services for.198 John Hanselman of AT&T testified that 
there were more than half a billion messages generated each year in 
interstate commerce, and it would not be reasonable to subject the carriers 
to liability, as proposed, for failing to know the content of each particular 
message.199 
                                                   
191. Id. at 24. 
192. Id. at 41 (testimony of Wayne Coy). 
193. Id. at 48. 
194. Id. at 69 (statement of Spencer J. Drayton). 
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196. Id. at 70. 
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On the final day of the hearings in 1951, Senator Herbert R. O’Conor 
of Maryland testified that the proposed bills were intended to strike at 
“organized criminals and hoodlums.”200 Senator O’Conor further argued 
that despite the reluctance of the FCC to take on oversight of the proposed 
bills, it was likely best suited to monitor for prohibited activities.201 
Senator O’Conor’s support for the bill, however, was challenged by 
Benedict P. Cottone, FCC general counsel, who argued that the bill posed 
a burden on the FCC in having to determine the fitness of applicants 
for  licensure.202 
The 1951 hearings were followed by a series of Senate reports.203 The 
first report, filed by Senator Johnson of Colorado, expressed the 
committee’s opinion that the “most effective and basic means of halting 
illegal off-track betting on racing is in the hands of local enforcement 
officials.”204 The recommendations were for licensure, and a ban on the 
transmission of racing information until after the conclusion of the 
event.205 The report clearly articulated that the bill’s purpose was to “aid 
the respective States in coping with off-track horse- and dog-race betting 
carried on illegally by bookmakers by denying or hampering the use of 
interstate communications facilities to furnish information and news 
essential to such operations.”206 The report noted that while initially 
proposed to “prohibit the transmission of all sporting information,” this 
would likely run into constitutional concerns.207 The Johnson Senate 
report clearly articulated that the definition of “gambling information” 
was “limited to information concerning horse racing and dog racing.”208 
While the gambling information provisions of the draft bill applied 
specifically to horse and dog racing, disseminators of all sporting 
information were required to file a statement that they were using the 
communication facilities for such a purpose though such transmissions 
were not prohibited nor made a federal crime.209 
A subsequent report, filed by Senator O’Conor, would have expanded 
the scope of the legislation so as to include within the purpose not only 
                                                   
200. Id. at 106 (statement of Herbert R. O’Conor). 
201. Id. at 107. 
202. Id. at 154 (testimony of Benedict P. Cottone). 
203. See S. REP. NO. 82-925 (1951); S. REP. NO. 82-927 (1951). 
204. S. REP. NO. 82-925, at 2 (1951). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 7. 
207. Id. at 26. 
208. Id. at 32. 
209. Id. at 36. 
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horse and dog racing, but also other sporting events.210 O’Conor’s report 
noted that while the Department of Justice opposed the draft bill, the 
Senate Crime Investigating Committee encouraged the consideration of 
the bill as a means of slowing the access of bookmakers to information.211 
The O’Conor report clearly advocated for a broader scope in the proposed 
law than was proposed by the Johnson report, though the bill would not 
pass, prompting another effort in 1954.212 But before the third hearing on 
the subject, a bill was introduced in 1953 that received the analysis of the 
Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.213 
The Senate report noted that the new bill was intended to assist the 
states “in coping with off-track horse- and dog-race betting carried on 
illegally by bookmakers by denying or hampering the use of interstate 
communications facilities . . . .”214 The 1953 report, like the 1951 Johnson 
report, banned the transmission of gambling information on horse and dog 
racing, but did not include other sports within that prohibition, instead 
requiring lessees or wire circuits to maintain a list of purchasers of sports 
information.215 But like the 1951 legislation, the 1953 legislation did not 
gain sufficient support to pass.216 
C. Antigambling Legislation–1954 
The third Senate hearing heard testimony from very few witnesses; 
however, for the first time, the subcommittee received statements and 
heard testimony from industry groups.217 While industry groups were 
present at the 1954 hearing, the proposed bill was not supported by the 
agency tasked with executing its enforcement.218 The Senate report that 
followed the hearing made clear that the purpose of the latest bill was to 
“prohibit the recurrence of the wire service as a tool of the bookmaking 
racket which made it possible to organize bookmakers throughout the 
country through the means of selling them a fast service provided by a 
network of communication facilities.”219 The 1954 bill, Senate Bill 3542, 
                                                   
210. S. REP. NO. 82-927, at 1. 
211. Id. at 2.  
212. Antigambling Legislation: Hearing on S. 3190 & S. 3542 Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83rd Cong. (1954). 
213. See S. REP. NO. 83-500 (1953). 
214. Id. at 5. 
215. Id. at 6. 
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sought to make clear that the legislation was only to apply to horse and 
dog racing, striking the word “sporting” from the draft.220 The Department 
of Justice concluded that sports like “baseball, boxing, and other sporting 
events . . . cannot be organized and controlled” in the same manner as 
animal racing, and were thus removed.221 While the sporting event 
language was struck from the prohibition, it remained an obligation for 
lessors disseminating sports event information to file statements detailing 
their activity with their common carriers.222 
The third Senate hearing on limiting the transmission of gambling 
information across wired communication facilities took place on June 7 
and 8, 1954.223 The hearing generated a transcript of forty-seven pages, 
the shortest transcript of any hearing regarding legislation that would 
become the Wire Act.224 Warren Olney III, assistant attorney general, 
testified that Senate Bill 3542 was essentially the same bill that the Justice 
Department had supported since 1950.225 Olney testified that the proposed 
bill was necessary because bookmaking monopolies were operating 
beyond the reach of state-level authorities by positioning themselves 
outside of the jurisdiction and transmitting wagering information into 
jurisdictions creating an interstate issue.226 
Rosel Hyde, chairman of the FCC, testified that he viewed preventing 
the transmission of wagering information as a law enforcement problem 
and not as an obligation of an administrative agency.227 Chairman Hyde 
noted that the proposed bill appeared to limit its own “effectiveness and 
efficiency” by banning communication facilities from transmitting 
gambling information in interstate or foreign commerce, but exempting 
gambling transmission for printed news or television and/or radio 
purposes.228 Hyde argued that it was his belief that Congress should pass 
a law that was to be enforced by local law enforcement agencies and not 
the FCC or common carriers.229 Rufus King, of the American Bar 
Association (ABA), testified that the proposed wagering information ban 
was endorsed by the ABA membership.230 In contrast, Walter Gallagher, 
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counsel for various sporting news agencies, including the Illinois Sport 
News and the Daily Sport News, testified that it was his belief that the 
proposed bills went too far in attempts to prohibit dissemination of 
wagering information.231 Gallagher suggested that it was problematic that 
wagering information, the possession of which was not prohibited at the 
state level, was proposed to be prohibited at the federal level.232 
D. Report of Proceedings–1956 
The fourth Senate hearing on a bill to limit the transmission of 
wagering information took place on July 2, 1956, before the 
Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce.233 Similar to the hearing in 1954, the 1956 
hearings contained debate on the legislative predecessor to the Wire Act, 
in addition to a bill that sought to amend slot machine regulations.234 The 
first person to testify regarding Senate Bill 950 was David Luce, first 
assistant, Criminal Division Department of Justice, who articulated that 
the bill had a dual purpose: first, to assist the states in the enforcement of 
their own laws; and second, to aid in the suppression of organized crime 
activities.235 Luce testified that the definition of gambling information was 
restricted to information relating to horse and dog racing.236 In response 
to a question from Senator Potter about whether this statute would have 
any impact on wire services carrying information about football or 
baseball games, Luce responded that the proposed bill only applied to 
horse and dog racing.237 Luce noted that the exclusion of other sports from 
the bill was prefaced on the belief that syndicated bookmaking had not 
entered the field of sports.238 
Warren Baker, of the FCC, noted that the agency no longer had 
objections to the proposed bill.239 Rufus King, appearing again for the 
ABA, testified that the new bill omitted the provision that restricted 
                                                   
organization actually supported amending the language to encapsulate additional games of chance). 
231. Id. at 28–29 (testimony of Walter Gallagher).  
232. Id. at 28. 
233. See Report of Proceedings: Hearing on S. 3018 & S. 950 Before the Subcomm. on 
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“instantaneous” transmission of gambling information.240 King seemed to 
rebut the testimony of Luce, arguing that organized crime had begun to 
shift its focus away from horse and dog racing into baseball, football, and 
college sports.241 King further testified that it was his belief that organized 
crime was involved in the fixing of college basketball games.242 King 
concluded by stating that while the ABA supported Senate Bill 950, 
earlier versions of the bill were more comprehensive and stronger, in 
his  opinion.243 
The fourth Senate hearing on a bill that predated the Wire Act 
suggested, once again, a very narrow interpretation of the scope of the 
proposed legislation.244 The New York Times reported that Rufus King’s 
comments about gambling and collegiate sports prompted Senator Potter 
to comment that Congress may wish to investigate the issue.245 The Times 
further noted that Potter was under the impression that the Justice 
Department appeared out of touch with the evolution of the gambling 
world.246 It would be nearly five years before the final two hearings on 
legislation regarding the transmission of wagering information, and nearly 
a decade after Senator Kefauver made his initial recommendations. 
E. Legislation Relating to Organized Crime–1961 
The House hearing in 1961 represented a change from previous 
hearings, as it saw discussions of various versions of bills that would 
accomplish similar objectives. Testimony revealed that the draft bills 
presented many of the same concerns as previous iterations, including: 
(1) being too broad or overly vague; (2) having questionable 
constitutional foundations; and (3) prompting questions about who would 
bear the burden of enforcement.247 The New York Times reported on the 
                                                   
240. Id. at 39 (testimony of Rufus King). 
241. Id. at 43.  
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House hearing, noting that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy estimated 
that organized gambling had a gross value of $7 billion.248 
In 1961, Congress held several hearings on omnibus bills aimed at 
halting the perceived growth of organized crime. One of the hearings 
occurred over seven days in May 1961 and heard testimony on a bill 
directly related to the version of the Wire Act that was signed into law.249 
Representative William McCulloch of Ohio introduced the hearings on 
the eleven bills to be debated by asking for nonpartisan support for the 
bills, noting that the majority of the bills were nearly identical to those 
from the previous Eisenhower administration.250 The Wire Act legislation 
was introduced as two separate bills, House Bill 3022251 and House 
Bill  7039.252 
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy testified first, citing anecdotes of 
corruption at the local level and the need for the federal government to 
step in and assist “honest citizens.”253 Kennedy further compared the 
corner bookmaker to the part of an iceberg that floats above the surface of 
the water, noting that the visible bookmaker represented only a small 
portion of the illegal gambling network.254 Kennedy further stressed the 
need for federal involvement by arguing that local officials were unable 
to reach the leaders of these gambling enterprises because they live far 
from the action.255 Kennedy further noted that the intention of the 
legislation was to limit the application to gambling as a business, not as a 
social activity.256 
Max D. Paglin testified on behalf of the FCC before the House of 
Representatives and reiterated the FCC’s long standing position that it did 
not desire to be in a situation in which it was tasked with law enforcement 
obligations.257 Paglin further informed the House committee that the 
proposed definition of “wire facility” might not encapsulate modern 
                                                   
of N.Y.C., noting the bill may criminalize a large number of potentially unintended activities). 
248. Congress Urged to Act on Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 1961, at 18.  
249. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, 
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250. Id. at 5 (statement of Rep. William McCulloch). 
251. Id. at 6. 
252. Id. at 8. 
253. Id. at 19 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.). 
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means of radio transmission.258 The National Association of Defense 
Lawyers in Criminal Cases, represented by Richard A. Green, filed a 
prepared statement arguing that the proposed House Bill 3022 “appear[s] 
to have little or no value in prosecuting gambling crimes.”259 The United 
States Independent Telephone Association (USITA), represented by 
Bradford Ross, testified that the association remained concerned that 
proposed House Bill 3022 would require the members to act as police to 
enforce the statute or face criminal and civil penalties themselves.260 
Dan F. Hazen, Assistant Vice President of Western Union, testified that 
he was concerned that the language used may require his employees to 
engage in investigative work.261 Hazen argued that the proposed 
regulations with penalty provisions seemingly targeted corporations like 
his that already made attempts to comply and assist law enforcement when 
they were made aware of allegations of illegal activity.262 
Concerns regarding the scope of House Bill 3022 were further 
highlighted by Arthur H. Christy, a representative of the New York City 
Bar Association, who believed that the proposed requirement for filing 
affidavits by operators transmitting gambling information was impractical 
and would be “difficult to enforce.”263 Christy further argued that 
enforcement of the proposed bill seemed impractical and relied on the 
employees of common carriers to enforce a federal law.264 The American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) argued that the language used was 
unnecessarily broad and placed an unconstitutional inhibition on freedom 
of expression for a broad class of activities.265 The House hearings would 
lead into Senate hearings in June of 1961.266 
                                                   
258. Id. at 132. 
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E. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime – 1961 
The Senate held their hearings in June 1961, over five nonconsecutive 
days, to debate a series of bills.267 The hearings would serve as 
companions to the hearings in the House of Representatives that occurred 
several weeks earlier.268 The Senate bill that would eventually become the 
Wire Act was labeled, “S. 1656.”269 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy 
opened the hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee by testifying 
to the importance of the seven proposed bills.270 
Kennedy stated that it was not the intention of the Department of 
Justice to usurp local police powers, but it was only the federal 
government that could tackle the complex structure of organized crime 
due to the multistate basis on which the organized crime groups 
operated.271 Kennedy testified that Senate Bill 1656 had been carefully 
drafted to protect the freedoms guaranteed to the press.272 The bill 
contained exemptions for “legitimate news reporting of sporting events,” 
and it was argued that nothing in the bill would alter the present state of 
sports reporting.273 Kennedy would further observe: “[i]n fact, wireless 
communication was not included in this bill because it is our belief that 
the Federal Communications Commission has ample authority to control 
the misuse of this means of communication.”274 Kennedy stated that the 
bill did not exempt common carriers, but that they should not be burdened 
unless there was intentional supplying or maintaining of facilities being 
used for gambling purposes.275 
Kennedy testified that while the bill “is not interested in the casual 
dissemination of information with respect to football, baseball or other 
sporting events between acquaintances,” the bill would apply to the 
professional gambler, who was a large layoff bettor who attempted to 
avoid liability by stating, “I just like to bet. I just make social wagers.”276 
Kennedy stressed that while the bill was not intended to apply to 
nonprofessional gamblers, it would be poor public policy for the 
                                                   
267. See id. 
268. See id. 
269. See id. 
270. Id. at 1 (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen.). 
271. Id. at 11. 
272. Id. at 12. 
273. Id. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. 
276. Id. at 12–13. 
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Department of Justice to be seen condoning some forms of gambling, but 
not others.277 
Richard March appeared on behalf of his client, the USITA, and his 
law partner, Bradford Ross, to deliver to the committee Ross’s 
statement.278 In the statement, Ross argued that Senate Bill 1656 placed 
telephone companies in a dilemma of facing regulatory or criminal 
prosecution or civil damages by having to act as an enforcement 
agency.279 Ross argued that making the telephone company responsible 
for determining whether a client was using a service for illegal gambling 
business would unfairly subject the companies to law suits from 
customers who had their service disconnected. John J. Hanselman, 
assistant vice president of AT&T, testified that the language restricting 
the bill to “wire communication facility” should be extended so that it 
encompassed any “communication facility.”280 Hanselman stated that his 
company believed the language of the bill should be modified and that his 
company had concerns about the absence of a provision to hold common 
carriers harmless.281 In a supplemental statement filed by Bradford Ross, 
he noted that the USITA would endorse a version of the Wire Act if the 
bill contained protections against civil suits resulting from termination of 
services at the direction of law enforcement.282 
Dan F. Hazen of the Western Union Telegraph Company testified that 
the company had concerns about the proposed bill and the absence of any 
requirement on the part of law enforcement to notify the provider of 
suspected criminal activity and failure of the company to terminate the 
service as the basis for a violation.283 Hazen noted that not only did the 
telegraph company not possess subpoena power, the Communications Act 
banned the monitoring of “leased facility services” to determine if there 
was a violation of law.284 
Rufus King of the ABA noted that the proposed bill was quite similar 
in scope to the original bill proposed in 1950.285 King noted that he had a 
personal concern over whether the bill did enough to protect the act of 
casual betting, noting that it was his interpretation that if he were to call 
                                                   
277. Id. at 13. 
278. Id. at 34 (statement of Richard S. T. March, Att’y, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n). 
279. Id. (statement of Bradford Ross, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n). 
280. Id. at 39 (statement of John J. Hanselman, Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.). 
281. Id. at 40. 
282. Id. at 45 (supplemental statement of Bradford Ross, U.S. Indep. Tel. Ass’n). 
283. Id. at 58 (statement of Dan F. Hazen, Assistant Vice President, W. Union Tel. Co.). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. at 64 (statement of Rufus King, Rice & King, appearing on behalf of the Am. Bar Ass’n). 
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his brother in Maryland and place a one-dollar bet on a baseball game, he 
would be violating the Wire Act.286 King went on to note that it struck the 
ABA as odd that while the Wire Act prohibited the transmission of 
wagering information, it did not prohibit the transfer of money for 
payment of gambling debts.287 
In response to the testimony of the telephone and telegraph executives, 
Herbert Miller, assistant attorney general, testified that the Department of 
Justice opposed any exemption for common carriers.288 Miller noted that 
if the common carriers determine that illegal activity was taking place, 
they should be in a position to act.289 The Department of Justice’s 
opposition to a “hold harmless” provision in the statute would leave 
improperly aggrieved customers with no resolution.290 Miller testified that 
the bill was intended to cover only sporting events and contests, but 
conceded, in response to a question, that wrestling was within the scope 
of the statute despite the fact that it was “more of a performance than a 
contest.”291 Miller went on to testify that the bill “was aimed at a particular 
situation, gambling, a specific type of gambling, and the layoff bettor.”292 
The Senate Judiciary hearing on Senate Bill 1656 represented the final 
full-scale hearing into the bills that were debated prior to the enactment 
of the Wire Act. However, there was an additional hearing, held as an 
executive session before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.293 The 
committee debated what final tweaks were to be made, including the 
incorporation of some of the common carriers requests.294 The final 
Senate Judiciary hearing reported that Senate Bill 1656 would be reported 
to the whole Senate.295 Following the House and Senate hearings, each 
legislative body submitted a report.296 
The Senate report noted that there was a modification to the text of the 
bill specifying that it was to apply to those in the business of betting or 
wagering.297 The legislation was to target bookmakers and layoff men 
                                                   
286. Id. at 65. 
287. Id. at 69. 
288. Id. at 275 (statement of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice).  
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 277. 
291. Id. at 278 (quoting Sen. Estes Kefauver). 
292. Id. (testimony of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., Dep’t of Justice). 
293. See Report of Proceeding: Hearing held before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (July 
10, 1961). 
294. See id. 
295. Id. at 69. 
296. S. REP. NO. 87-588 (1961); H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961). 
297. S. REP. NO. 87-588, at 2 (1961). 
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“who need incoming and outgoing wire communication in order to 
operate.”298 The Senate report included a letter from the attorney general 
to the vice president that noted that the modern bookmaker relied on wire 
communications for not only horse racing results, but also for wagering 
on sporting events.299 The House Report of August 17, 1961, echoes much 
of the sentiment of the Senate report.300 There is little indication across 
the totality of the Wire Act’s legislative history that the application 
beyond sports wagering inclusive of dog and horse racing was ever 
contemplated. Over eleven years, there was a significant evolution in what 
was proposed. 
F. Evolution of the Wire Act 
The scope of the Wire Act experienced significant changes after a 
decade of evolution. The first version of the bill contained a very specific 
focus on horse racing.301 The first major evolutionary moment would 
come in 1954, when references to sporting events would be replaced with 
specific reference to horse and dog racing.302 This trend would continue 
until the Kennedy administration introduced new versions of the Wire 
Act.303 The Wire Act’s focus was shifted back to sporting events and 
contests, and those who made a business of betting and wagering.304 
The first attempt to pass legislation banning the transmission of 
wagering information through wire was Senate Bill 3358, in 1950.305 
Senate Bill 3358 was composed of six sections.306 Section one stated that 
the bill was intended to assist the states in the enforcement of their laws 
to suppress organized gambling activities.307 Section two defined five 
terms, including “gambling information” as: 
[B]ets or wagers or related information assisting in the placing of 
bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or transactions or 
information facilitating betting or wagering activities on any 
                                                   
298. Id. at 3.  
299. Id. at 4–5.  
300. H.R. REP. NO. 87-967 (1961). 
301. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S.3358 Before the Senate Subcomm. 
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. 2 (1950). 
302. See S. REP. NO. 83-1652, at 1 (1954). 
303. H.R. 3022, 87th Cong. (1961). 
304. Id. 
305. See Transmission of Gambling Information: Hearing on S.3358 Before the Senate Subcomm. 
of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong. (1950). 
306. Id. at 1–2. 
307. Id. at 1. 
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sporting event or contest. In connection with horse racing, 
gambling information includes among other things entries, 
scratches, jockeys, jockey changes, weights, probable 
winners . . . betting odds, changes in the betting odds, the post 
positions, the results, and the prices paid.308 
Section three included the applicability of the statute, noting that it was 
unlawful to maintain any facility, other than a radio broadcasting facility, 
if that facility received or transmitted gambling information.309 
Senate Bill 2116 was the subject of a Senate hearing one year after 
Senate Bill 3358.310 Senate Bill 2116 was nearly identical to its 
predecessor bill, Senate Bill 3358, containing the exact same penalties for 
violations and requiring enforcement by the common carriers.311 The 
introduction of bills of identical text is not uncommon, in particular when 
bills are introduced toward the conclusion of the congressional term. 
In 1954, Senate Bill 3542 was introduced and was the subject of 
hearings.312 Senate Bill 3542 represented the first major shift in the 
evolution of legislation to curb the transmission of wagering information, 
as the legislation that mentioned sporting events had those references 
deleted and replaced by horse or dog racing.313 Senate Bill 3542 also 
included an addition, in section three, that contained a clarification 
statement that the act was not intended to prevent the transmission of news 
regarding sporting events to press outlets.314 Additionally, Senate Bill 
3542 required a written statement from the lessee as opposed to a sworn 
affidavit regarding the intended purpose of the lease of wire services.315 
There were no references in the bill to any criminal punishments.316 
Senate Bill 950 was introduced in February 1955; however, the bill 
would not have a hearing until July of 1956.317 Senate Bill 950 contained 
five sections.318 Section two of the proposed statute continued to define 
                                                   
308. Id. 
309. Id. at 2.  
310. See Anticrime Legislation: Hearing on S. 1563, S. 1564, S. 1624 & S. 2116 Before the Comm. 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 82nd Cong. 1–2 (1951). 
311. Id. at 1–2. 
312. See Antigambling Legislation: Hearing on S. 3190 & S. 3452 Before the S. Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 83rd Cong. 1–3 (1954).  
313. Id. 
314. Id. at 2. 
315. Id.  
316. Id. 
317. See Report of Proceedings: Hearing on S. 3018 & S. 950 Before the Subcomm. on 
Communications of the S. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong. (1956). 
318. See S. 950, 84th Cong. (1955). 
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gambling information as only containing dog and horse racing events or 
contests.319 Senate Bill 950 provided for a more detailed explanation of 
the obligations of common carriers upon receipt of a notice from law 
enforcement.320 While common carriers had a similar burden placed upon 
them, as in the previous bills, absent from Senate Bill 950 was any role 
for the FCC to participate in the enforcement of the 
proposed legislation.321 
In 1961, the House of Representatives debated two bills that were 
classified as predecessors to the passed version of the Wire Act. House 
Bill 3022 was the first of the two bills to be debated.322 Missing from 
House Bill 3022 was the preamble that had consistently stated that the 
purpose of the bill was to assist the states in enforcing their own anti-
gambling laws.323 Also changed was the definition of gambling 
information. No longer did the legislation reference “animal racing”; 
instead, the definition referred solely to “sports event or a contest,” and 
with the definition there was also a qualification that a violator must be in 
the “business of accepting such wagers.”324 While not inclusive of animal 
racing, House Bill 3022 did propose to ban participation in lotteries with 
limited exceptions (e.g., lotteries for a charitable purpose).325 House Bill 
3022 also required the filing of affidavits as to whether a wire operator 
has transmitted wagering information in the past twelve months and 
imposed criminal penalties for failure to file or false filing of an 
affidavit.326 House Bill 3022 represented a dramatic shift from the 
proposed Senate Bill 950. The House bill was much more focused on 
federal objectives and on those in the “business of accepting wagers.”327 
House Bill 7039, which was debated during the same hearing as House 
Bill 3022, was narrowly focused on the individuals who “lease[], 
furnish[], or maintain[]” wire communication facilities.328 The bill 
proposed that the transmission of bets or wagers or assisting others in 
placing of bets or wagers in interstate commerce was punishable by a fine 
not to exceed $10,000 or two years in prison.329 House Bill 7039 
                                                   
319. Id.  
320. Id. 
321. Id. 
322. See H.R. 3022, 87th Cong. (1961). 
323. Id. 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. at 2.  
328. See H.R. 7039, 87th Cong. (1961). 
329. Id. 
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specifically referenced sporting events or contests, and while it did not 
state that it was drafted to assist states in enforcement of their own state 
laws, it stated that it did not create immunity under any state law.330 
Senate Bill 1656, introduced in April 1961 and debated during Senate 
hearings, was the companion to House Bill 7039, and the final Senate 
version of the bill that would become the Wire Act.331 The bill evolved 
from introduction on April 18, 1961, to the bill that was reported on July 
24, 1961, though the principle change was the inclusion of the phrase 
“[w]hoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering,” from 
the original “[w]hoever leases, furnishes, or maintains any 
communication facility with intent.”332 The Senate bill’s change of the 
language of the companion House bill to implement the “[w]hoever being 
engaged in the business of betting or wagering” in the place of “[w]hoever 
leases, furnishes or maintains,” bears little indication that anything other 
than added specificity of the intended subject of the statute,333 a fact 
supported by the associated hearings.334 
The scope of the Wire Act has been a subject of much debate, 
particularly since the rise of the internet.335 The congressional hearings 
held from 1950 to 1961 reveal that the Wire Act’s scope was often 
debated. However, the intent of the law appeared to have been limited to 
the transmission of wagering information in relation to sporting events or 
animal racing events, with little indication that other gambling activities 
were intended to be included in any of the later draft bills. Statements, 
such as those made in 2015 by Republican Congressman Jason Chaffetz 
that it was Congress’s intent to ban all forms of wagering under the Wire 
Act, are unsupported by the hearings that took place over the eleven years 
of congressional hearings.336 Similarly, there appears to be little indication 
that Congress intended the amendment to Senate Bill 1656 to incorporate 
                                                   
330. Id. 
331. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. (1961). 
332. See S. 1656, 87th Cong. (Apr. 18, 1961); S. 1656, 87th Cong. (July 24, 1961). 
333. See S. 1656, 87th Cong. (July 24, 1961). 
334. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. (1961). 
335. See, e.g., In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d sub nom, In 
re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 263 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that non-sports internet gambling 
is not prohibited by the Wire Act). 
336. See Chaffetz, Gabbard Work to Restore America’s Wire Act, TULSI GABBARD (Feb. 4, 2015),  
https://gabbard.house.gov/news/press-releases/chaffetz-gabbard-work-restore-americas-wire-act 
[https://perma.cc/74BP-HJCU]. 
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the range of activities suggested by the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum.337 While the legislative history helps elucidate Congress’s 
intent with regards to the scope of the Wire Act, numerous questions 
regarding the statute’s application persist. In Part III, this Article examines 
some of the prominent questions surrounding the application of the Wire 
Act in the modern internet era. 
III. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE WIRE ACT? 
The scope of the Wire Act has been something of an open question 
since at least the late-1990s, when Congress began to try and regulate 
online gambling.338 Whether the Wire Act applies to sports wagering 
alone, or whether it applies to a variety of activities, has been the primary 
focus of Wire Act discussions and there remain a number of prescient 
questions regarding the statute as a result of the Murphy decision, and 
expanding state legalization of sports wagering.339 Part III examines some 
of the most pressing questions regarding the Wire Act’s scope, including: 
(1) whether the Wire Act applies to the internet; (2) who is in the 
“business of betting”; (3) whether the Wire Act applies exclusively to 
sports betting; (4) what constitutes “information” assisting in placing bets 
or wagers; and (5) whether the Wire Act’s safe harbor exempts 
transmissions that pass through third-party states that do not allow the 
same conduct that is allowed in both the originating and receiving 
jurisdiction. 
A. The Wire Act and the Internet 
The Wire Act was passed in 1961, decades before the internet became 
ubiquitous in American homes.340 While then-Attorney General Robert F. 
Kennedy341 and the subsequent Senate report342 noted that wireless 
communications were not to be included within the statute’s scope, the 
                                                   
337. See ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16. 
338. The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2–3 (1997). 
339. See Nick Rummell, Worries of Online Gambling Crackdown Spur States to Action, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (May 20, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/worries-of-online-
gambling-crackdown-spur-states-to-action [https://perma.cc/KL6X-TW4A]. 
340. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000-2015, PEW RES. CTR. 
(June 26, 2015), https://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-2000-2015 
[https://perma.cc/6NJJ-2ZSW]. 
341. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on 
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. 12 (1961). 
342. S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (1961). 
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internet still relies on wired communications facilities in order to exist.343 
But the application of the Wire Act to the internet had obviously not been 
contemplated in 1961, as the internet remained years away, leaving 
contemporary courts to address the question of whether the Wire Act 
applies to the internet.344 
One of the first cases to apply the Wire Act to internet sports wagering 
was United States v. Cohen345 in 2001. Cohen operated a sports betting 
operation in Antigua that accepted wagers both via the telephone and via 
the internet.346 While Cohen never directly appealed the issue of whether 
the Wire Act applied to internet wagering, in addition to the telephone 
wagering, the court expressed that the internet communications passed 
through “wire facilities,” thus implicating the statute.347 In re Mastercard 
adds further support to the position that, as internet wagering passes 
through wire communication facilities, the Wire Act is applicable to 
internet conduct.348 In United States v. Lyons,349 the defendants argued, on 
appeal, that the Wire Act is inapplicable to the internet, as it is not a “wire 
communication facility;” however, the First Circuit rejected this argument 
noting that the statute has regularly been attached to infringing conduct 
over the internet, and that the internet involves a transmission “to and 
from  customers.”350 
While, in early attempts to regulate internet gambling, congressional 
testimony may have lacked certainty regarding the application of existing 
laws to the internet,351 courts have not struggled to find that the Wire Act 
incorporates the internet within its prohibition of the use of a “wire 
communication facility.”352 The Wire Act appears to certainly apply to 
transactions taking place via the internet, but the statute only applies to 
                                                   
343. For an overview of how the internet functions, see Steven Li, How Does the Internet Work?, 
MEDIUM (Aug. 1, 2017), https://medium.com/@User3141592/how-does-the-internet-work-
edc2e22e7eb8 [https://perma.cc/D5H6-4F3F]. 
344. C. Jeremy Pope, Losing the Battle but Winning the War: The Federal Government’s Attempts 
to Regulate Internet Gaming Through Utilization of the Wire Act and Other Means, 74 MISS. L.J. 
903, 907 (2005). 
345. 260 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2001). 
346. Id. at 70–71. 
347. Id. at 76. 
348. In re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468, 479–81 (E.D. La. 2001), aff’d sub nom, In 
re MasterCard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing that, while the Wire Act is limited 
to interstate internet sports wagering, such conduct does fall with the statute’s scope). 
349. 740 F.3d 702 (1st Cir. 2014). 
350. Id. at 716–18. 
351. See The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). 
352. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018). 
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those in the “business of betting or wagering,” which is examined in 
section B.353 
B. Who is in the Business of Betting or Wagering? 
The phrase “business of betting or wagering” appears in a variety of 
federal statutes, including the Wire Act and the UIGEA.354 The legislative 
hearings in the later years of efforts to pass Wire Act legislation noted the 
importance of not targeting casual bettors, but instead targeting 
bookmakers, and large layoff bettors.355 Hayes and Conigliaro argued that 
the plain language interpretation of the Wire Act supports a narrow 
interpretation as to the scope of the phrase “the business of betting or 
wagering.”356 A narrow interpretation, as suggested, would incorporate a 
bookmaker, as the bookmaker is obviously within the business of 
accepting bets or wagers, but may not incorporate a parimutuel operator, 
“who has no stake in the event’s outcome and, thus, is not itself betting or 
wagering.”357 The lack of definition within the statute, and the narrow 
result of the plain meaning may suggest that the phrase has some 
ambiguity requiring a more extensive examination of the 
legislative  history.358 
The legislative history of the Wire Act contains repeated observations 
that the statute was not intended to target the casual or social wager made 
amongst friends.359 The Senate report that discusses the purpose of the 
addition of the “business of betting or wagering” language states 
as  follows: 
The second amendment changes the language of the bill, as 
introduced (which prohibited the leasing, furnishing, or 
maintaining of wire communication facility with intent that it be 
used for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets 
or wagers), to prohibit the use of wire communication facility by 
persons engaged in the business of betting or wagering, in the 
                                                   
353. Id. 
354. See Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, “The Business of Betting or Wagering”: A 
Unifying View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 447 (2009). 
355. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. 12–13 (1961). 
356. Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 451–52. 
357. Id. at 452. 
358. Id. 
359. See The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings 
on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. 12–13 (1961); supra section II.E. 
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belief that the individual user, engaged in the business of betting 
or wagering, is the person at whom the proposed legislation 
should be directed; and has further amended the bill to prohibit 
the transmission of wire communications which entitle the 
recipient to receive money as the result of betting or wagering 
which is designed to close another avenue utilized by gamblers 
for the conduct of their business.360 
The purpose of the amended language was to target those running 
gambling businesses and to close loopholes that might allow someone to 
escape prosecution. The legislation was referred to as targeting organized 
crime and professional gambling operations.361 By 1961, it became 
apparent that Congress supported a more limited range of targeted entities, 
through a narrow interpretation of those in the business of betting 
or  wagering. 
Although the legislative history of the Wire Act supports a narrow 
application of the statute, the case law is perhaps slightly broader. 
Nevertheless, there has been no direct challenge to the business of betting 
or wagering not involving “bookmakers, professional gamblers, criminal 
organizations, or individuals associated with such persons.”362 
Importantly, courts have held that the Wire Act does not incorporate the 
act of mere betting.363 While there is likely a fact-specific analysis of when 
casual betting becomes a gambling business, in one case regarding an 
ongoing relationship between a bettor and an acquaintance, where the 
acquaintance accepted between fifty and seventy wagers, the Court found 
that the activity violated the Wire Act.364 The Wire Act’s application to 
those in the business of betting or wagering is likely a fairly narrow scope 
of activities with which the government is capable of targeting both by the 
law’s plain language and existing jurisprudence.365 
                                                   
360. S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (1961). 
361. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on 
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. 12 (1961). 
362. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 460–61. 
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364. Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 462 (citing Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 
630–31 (8th Cir. 1968)). 
365. See id. at 465–66. 
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C. Does the Wire Act only Apply to Sports Betting? 
Indeed, the most enduring question in recent memory about the Wire 
Act’s scope asks whether the Wire Act incorporates only sports betting or 
whether it incorporates a plurality of activities.366 The 1997 internet 
gambling hearing featured testimony that elucidated the perception that 
the Wire Act was only intended to apply to sports wagering.367 Gambling 
expert Anthony Cabot testified: 
The key deficits with application of current law to Internet 
gambling would be solved by this bill’s expansion of the 
definition of a communication facility, by its removing of 
ambiguities caused by the words “sporting event or contest,” and 
by broadening the definition of a bet or wager.368 
The implication of Cabot’s testimony was that the Wire Act would 
require an amendment to incorporate activities beyond sports betting.369 
There is virtually no testimony in the final two Wire-Act-related hearings 
that indicate the scope of the bill to incorporate a range of activities 
beyond sports betting.370 In fact, the assistant attorney general testified 
that the statute “was aimed at a particular situation, gambling, a specific 
type of gambling, and the layoff bettor.”371 The Miller testimony was in 
reference to the statute targeting the narrow gambling activity of sports 
betting.372 Contrary to the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel’s assertions that 
the amendments to the language imposing the “business of betting or 
wagering” language was part of a scheme to limit only one portion of the 
statute to sports betting or wagering, there is no indication in the Senate 
report detailing this change that such was the intent.373 
                                                   
366. See Mark Hichar & Erica Okerberg, DOJ Opinion Increases the Scope of the Wire Act, 
Significantly Affecting Gaming Industry Stakeholders, 23 GAMING L. REV. 168 (2019). 
367. The Internet Gambling Act of 1997: Hearing on S. 474 Before the Subcomm. on Technology, 
Terrorism, and Government Information of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). 
368. Id. at 24 (statement of Anthony Cabot). 
369. Id. 
370. See Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, 
H.R. 3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039 Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961); The Attorney General’s 
Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, 
S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961). 
371. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on 
S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
87th Cong. 278 (1961) (statement of Herbert Miller, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the U.S.). 
372. Id. 
373. S. REP. No. 87-588 (1961). 
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The case law on the whether the Wire Act only applies to sports 
wagering is mixed, with In re Mastercard being the most prominent 
decision to hold that the statute is limited to wagering on “sporting events 
or contests.”374 In addition to the Fifth Circuit, there is dicta from the First 
Circuit supporting a conclusion that the Wire Act applies exclusively to 
betting and wagering on sporting events or contests.375 Meanwhile, in 
other cases, such as United States v. Lombardo,376 courts have concluded 
that the sporting event or contest language is limited to individual 
prohibitions within the two clauses of the statute but the statute as a whole 
is more broadly applicable.377 The Lombardo decision as to the scope of 
the Wire Act is nearly entirely based on a reading of the statute, and 
summarily dismisses the In re Mastercard decision on the basis of the fact 
that the decision was based on a prohibition within the Wire Act that 
includes the sporting events or contests language, while not engaging with 
the fact that the In re Mastercard decision does not delve into this 
delineation between the clauses.378 Instead, the Utah District Court looks 
to a New York case wherein the defendant, who operated an online casino, 
was charged with a variety of state and federal counts.379 While the 
Lombardo decision was correct regarding the New York v. World 
Interactive Gaming Corp.380 decision to convict the defendants, the New 
York state court did not address the scope of the “sporting events and 
contests” language and instead focused the statute’s application to those 
in the business of betting or wagering.381 Indeed, the 2018 Wire Act 
memorandum suggests that at least four cases have indicated that the Wire 
Act’s sporting event or contest language may apply to only a specific 
                                                   
374. In re Mastercard Int’l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “[t]he district court 
concluded that the Wire Act concerns gambling on sporting events or contests and that the Plaintiffs 
had failed to allege that they had engaged in internet sports gambling” and “agree[ing] with the district 
court’s statutory interpretation, its reading of the relevant case law, its summary of the relevant 
legislative history, and its conclusion”). 
375. See United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 718 (1st Cir. 2014). 
376. 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (D. Utah 2007).  
377. Id. at 1278–82 (noting that its analysis was not actually necessary to its determination of the 
defendants’ motions as the defendants did appear to engage in some conduct that would still implicate 
the Wire Act). 
378. Id. at 1279–80. 
379. Id. (citing New York. v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 852, 714 N.Y.S.2d 
844 (Sup. Ct. 1999)). 
380. 185 Misc. 2d 852, 714 N.Y.S.2d 844, 861–62 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
381. Id. 
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portion of the statute,382 but the overwhelming majority of reported cases 
have dealt with bookmaking as the targeted offense.383 
The legislative history of the Wire Act provides a clear indication that 
the intent of the statute was to target bookmakers and layoff bettors and 
not the casual gambler betting on sporting events or contests.384 There is 
virtually no indication in the hearings or reports from 1961 that Congress 
intended a broader range of activities to be targeted.385 The plain reading 
of the statutory text has been referred to as both ambiguous386 and not 
ambiguous.387 While there appears to be sufficient ambiguity that two 
justice departments, and various federal district courts have reached 
different conclusions as to where the sporting events and contests 
language applies, this in principle should justify an examination of the 
legislative history,388 which would lead to the conclusion that the Wire 
Act as a whole was intended to implicate a very small segment of the 
illegal gambling industry involving betting on sporting events and 
contests. There is also a pressing need to address the question of what 
information is used to assist in the placing of bets or wagers, particularly 
as legal sports gambling expands nationwide and gaming operators and 
supporting industries look to control costs. 
D. What is Information Assisting in Placing Bets or Wagers? 
The Wire Act prohibits the “transmission of . . . information assisting 
in the placing of bets or wagers,” but what exactly is included within 
                                                   
382. ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16, at 4 n.5. 
383. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 460–61 (suggesting that in the roughly 190 
reported federal decisions involving the a Wire Act conviction being upheld, the decision has involved 
“bookmakers, professional gamblers, criminal organizations, or individuals associated with such 
persons”).  
384. See supra section II.E. 
385. Legislation Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on H.R. 468, H.R. 1246, H.R. 3021, H.R. 
3022, H.R. 3023, H.R. 3246, H.R. 5230, H.R. 6571, H.R. 6572, H.R. 6909, H.R. 7039 Before 
Subcomm. No. 5 of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961); see also The Attorney General’s 
Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearings on S. 1653, S. 1654, S. 1955, S. 1656, 
S. 1657, S. 1658 & S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. (1961). 
386. See SEITZ MEMO, supra note 15, at 4–6. 
387. See ENGEL MEMO, supra note 16, at 23. 
388. See Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 3 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 1, 7 (1954) (noting that even staunch supporters of the plain meaning rule recognize that 
legislative history may be used to resolve ambiguity); Maxine D. Goodman, Reconstructing the Plain 
Language Rule of Statutory Construction: How and Why, 65 MONT. L. REV. 229, 261 (2004) 
(discussing a New York statute that governs statutory construction, which says that where legislation 
is clear as to legislative intent, and there is not ambiguity, courts should not endeavor further; but 
when it is not clear from the text, the court may be required to look into the intent of the legislature). 
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“information” is an open question.389 In United States v. Scavo,390 Frank 
Scavo was convicted under the Wire Act for providing a Minneapolis 
bookmaker with odds and point spread information.391 Scavo appealed, 
arguing, amongst other things, that there was insufficient evidence to 
support a Wire Act conviction.392 The Court of Appeals rejected Scavo’s 
argument, finding that the supplying of line information was sufficient to 
implicate the reach of the Wire Act.393 
In contrast, in United States v. Baborian,394 the defendant was accused 
of both wagering and providing betting opinions on which games would 
be best for a codefendant to wager on.395 The court found that Baborian 
was a mere casual bettor, and Congress did not intend to criminalize the 
discussion and evaluation of outcomes or opinions of sporting events 
amongst friends.396 While these cases do little to elucidate the outer 
boundaries of what information is within the scope of the Wire Act, it is 
evident from the Scavo decision that information that enables a 
bookmaker to operate, such as providing odds and betting line 
information, is likely sufficient to trigger the statute.397 Merely expressing 
betting predictions, on the other hand, likely does not trigger the statute.398 
E. Does the Wire Act Prohibit the Intermediate Routing of 
Gambling  Information? 
Whether the Wire Act’s safe harbor protection exempts the so-called 
intermediate routing of information is a question that has been asked more 
frequently since the Murphy decision, and the doors of opportunity for 
states to legalize sports betting have opened.399 The safe harbor provision 
is contained within section (b) of the Wire Act and states as follows: 
                                                   
389. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018). The mention of information is present in both Wire Act clauses 
“information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest” and “or for 
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.” Id. 
390. 593 F.2d 837 (8th Cir. 1979). 
391. Id. at 839–40. 
392. Id. at 840. 
393.  Id. at 841. 
394. 528 F. Supp. 324 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom, United States v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 
395. Id. at 326. 
396. Id. at 331. 
397. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 840–42 (8th Cir. 1979). 
398. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. at 331. 
399. See Christine Swanick, DOJ Opinion Leaves Industry Hanging: If UIGEA Exclusions Don’t 
Modify the Wire Act What Does That Mean for Intrastate Gambling Transactions?, SHEPPARD 
MULLIN FIN. & BANKR. L. BLOG (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.bankruptcylawblog.com/uigea-
exclusions-dont-modify-wire-act.html [https://perma.cc/VZ9F-SRKJ]. 
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Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the 
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of information for 
use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the 
transmission of information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State or foreign 
country where betting on that sporting event or contest is legal 
into a State or foreign country in which such betting is legal.400 
For example, intermediate routing occurs when data that originates in 
state A, New Jersey, where the activity is legal and ends in state C, 
Nevada, where the activity is also legal, passes through state B, 
Washington, where the implicated activity is illegal.401 The UIGEA 
exempts intermediate routing specifically, and for that reason the absence 
of such a provision in the Wire Act raises concerns that there is no such 
protection from intermediate routing implicating the statute.402 While not 
conclusive, there is an indication in the House report that Congress 
intended for intermediate routing to not be a concern.403 In explaining the 
safe harbor provision, the report states: 
Phrased differently, the transmission of gambling information on 
a horserace from a State where betting on that horserace is legal 
to a State where betting on the same horserace is legal is not 
within the prohibitions of the bill. Since Nevada is the only State 
which has legalized offtrack betting, this exemption will only be 
applicable to it. For example, in New York State parimutuel 
betting at a racetrack is authorized by State law. Only in Nevada 
is it lawful to make and accept bets on the race held in the State 
of New York where parimutuel betting at a racetrack is authorized 
by law. Therefore, the exemption will permit the transmission of 
information assisting in the placing of bets and wagers from New 
York to Nevada. On the other hand, it is unlawful to make and 
accept bets in New York State on a race being run in Nevada. 
Therefore, the transmission of information assisting in the placing 
of bets and wagers from Nevada to New York would be contrary 
to the provisions of the bill. Nothing in the exemption, however, 
will permit the transmission of bets and wagers or money by wire 
                                                   
400. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (b) (2018). 
401. See DOJ Reconsiders Its View on the Wire Act – What Happens Now?, DUANE MORRIS 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.duanemorris.com/alerts/doj_reconsiders_view_wire_act_what_happen
s_now_0119.html [https://perma.cc/GBA7-LW5D]. 
402. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E) (2006) (“The intermediate routing of electronic data shall not 
determine the location or locations in which a bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”). 
403. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961). 
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as a result of a bet or wager from or to any State whether betting 
is legal in that State or not.404 
The passage, while not addressing illegality in noncontiguous states, 
implies that the intent was to allow for transmission that crosses through 
third-party states where the activity is illegal—provided the transaction 
remains unchanged in both the originating and receiving jurisdiction 
where the activity is lawful.405 
In Lyons, the First Circuit Court of Appeals explained that “the safe 
harbor provision only applies to the transmission of ‘information assisting 
in the placing of bets.’ The safe harbor provision does not exempt from 
liability the interstate transmission of bets themselves.”406 So, while the 
safe harbor may enable the transmission of information such as betting 
odds and information to travel interstate between friendly jurisdictions, 
the statute does not enable interstate wagering compacts, even if legal in 
both the originating and receiving jurisdiction.407 The First Circuit 
clarified that “the Wire Act prohibits interstate gambling without 
criminalizing lawful intrastate gambling or prohibiting the transmission 
of data needed to enable intrastate gambling on events held in other states 
if gambling in both states on such events is lawful.”408 There is no case 
directly on point addressing the intermediate routing issue. Perhaps most 
informative is a case which originated in 1962.409 
In United States v. Yaquinta,410 six defendants were operating a 
bookmaking operation whereby the defendant, Yaquinta, would relay 
horse racing information that he received by radio transmitter to others in 
bookmaking shops around the state of West Virginia.411 Known to the 
defendants, long distance calls were connected via an operator in Ohio, 
and thus when Yaquinta placed his calls to others in West Virginia the 
calls were being routed through a wire communication facility in Ohio.412 
In denying the defendants’ motions to dismiss, the Northern District of 
West Virginia judge cited the congressional intent of stamping out illegal 
gambling.413 This is indeed an important point of distinction as the 
                                                   
404. Id. 
405. Id. 
406. United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 713 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. McDonough, 
835 F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1988)); United States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
407. Id. 
408. Id. 
409. United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. W. Va. 1962). 
410. 204 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. W. Va. 1962). 
411. Id. at 277. 
412. Id. 
413. Id. at 278–79. 
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Yaquinta defendants were engaged in illegal conduct in both West 
Virginia and Ohio, which is hardly the scenario of two jurisdictions that 
each have legalized an activity and a third that has not.414 The Yaquinta 
and Lyons cases appear to reach different conclusions regarding the safety 
of intermediate routing; in all likelihood it was not Congress’s intent to 
allow pass-through states to criminalize conduct, legal at both the origin 
and destination, but it appears as though an ambitious prosecutor in a state 
where information passes through, particularly if there is a re-routing of 
sorts, akin to operating patching together calls, there is a possibility for 
exposure under the Wire Act.415 
1. Pooling 
The practice of pooling player funds from multiple states is a common 
practice in various forms of online gambling. It is how the Mega Millions 
and Powerball lotteries are able to offer jackpots worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars, effectively having a lottery that includes forty-four 
states, as well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.416 
The advantage of pooling agreements is that it allows smaller states to 
offer the same types of pricing as larger states without gambling 
companies being exposed to the larger risk associated with a smaller 
market.417 Since prior to the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel opinion, the 
agreements have been popular among states that allow online poker and 
other forms of internet gambling.418 Exempting pooling from the Wire Act 
for horse racing was deemed necessary to allow the sport to remain 
commercially viable, as it enabled interstate simulcast racing.419 
                                                   
414. Id. 
415. H.R. REP. No. 87-967, at 3 (1961). Some states have attempted to make their own declarations 
regarding the non-application of intermediate routing, though these declarations are worthless, as 
states cannot legislate the scope of federal law. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY SPORTS WAGER 
LAW P.L. 2018, C.33, https://www.nj.gov/lps/ge/docs/SportsBetting/SportsWageringLawPL2018c3
3.pdf [https://perma.cc/AX8K-DAUT]. 
416. See Ryan Butler, Could States Share Sports Betting Liquidity Despite Laws?, GAMBLING.COM 
(Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.gambling.com/news/could-states-share-sports-betting-liquidity-despite-
laws-1753100 [https://perma.cc/G46P-4Y87]. 
417. Tamara S. Malvin, Online Gambling and the DOJ’s Wire Act Reinterpretation, JDSUPRA (Jan. 
28, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/online-gambling-and-the-doj-s-wire-act-66154 
[https://perma.cc/ VZ5A-J8UC]. 
418. James G. Gatto, INSIGHT: Interstate Online Gambling Dealt Blow by DOJ Flip Flop on Wire 
Act, BLOOMBERG L. (Feb. 14, 2019, 1:01 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/white-collar-and-
criminal-law/insight-interstate-online-gambling-dealt-blow-by-doj-flip-flop-on-wire-act 
[https://perma.cc/GVX9-A89V]. 
419. Andy Faust, Thanks to the Wire Act, There is No “Shared Liquidity” in Sports Betting, 
LEGAL SPORTS BETTING (June 10, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://www.legalsportsbetting.com/news/than
ks-to-the-wire-act-there-is-no-shared-liquidity-in-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/7888-JAU4]. 
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By virtue of accepting bets or wagers in interstate commerce, internet 
gambling activities, beyond sports wagering, may face a new threat that 
they were presumed safe based on the 2018 Office of Legal Counsel 
memorandum.420 But by the text of the statute, the sports betting 
community remains prohibited from accepting bets or wagers via 
interstate wire communication facilities, as the statute’s safe harbor only 
enables the interstate (or foreign) transmission of information, not the bets 
and wagers themselves.421 While UIGEA exempts intermediate routing 
concerns that may arise with pooling, UIGEA’s rule of construction does 
not alter or modify any other state or federal law,422 leaving in place the 
Wire Act’s prohibition on interstate transmission via wire communication 
facility of bets or wagers, even where the betting or wagering was legal in 
both jurisdictions.423 
Some of the common questions regarding the scope of the Wire Act 
have been analyzed in Part III. Part IV examines the application of the 
Wire Act to two of the largest segments of the sports gambling industry 
currently operating in interstate commerce, the daily fantasy sports 
industry, and the gambling data sales industry. 
IV. APPLYING THE WIRE ACT IN THE MODERN WORLD 
In the nearly sixty years since the passage of the Wire Act much has 
changed, not only technologically, but with respect to moral concerns 
across society. Gambling is viewed less as a scourge that preys on people 
than it is a viable funding mechanism for projects that are desperately 
                                                   
420. Id. 
421. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (1994). A court has never directly addressed the issue of whether 
interstate parimutuel pools trigger the Wire Act, but dicta from the Eighth Circuit suggests that such 
interstate pooling may offend the statute. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 354, at 464–65 (“Here, 
the trial record suggests that North Dakota passed the 2001 account wagering statute in an attempt to 
attract interstate electronic betting. If the reach of § 1084 is as broad as its legislative history suggests, 
the attempt, if successful, will violate federal law. We leave that issue to another day.” (citing United 
States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
422. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2006) (providing UIGEA’s rule of construction, which states that “[n]o 
provision of this subchapter shall be construed as altering, limiting, or extending any Federal or State 
law or Tribal-State compact prohibiting, permitting, or regulating gambling within the 
United  States”). 
423. See United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (“As we have noted, that safe 
harbor excludes not only the transmission of bets, but also the transmission of betting information to 
or from a jurisdiction in which betting is illegal. As a result, that provision is inapplicable here, even 
if WSE had only ever transmitted betting information.”).  
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needed.424 One of the first tests of the willingness of American society to 
accept legalized sports betting was the rise of daily fantasy sports.425 
A. Daily Fantasy Sports and the Wire Act 
The daily fantasy sports industry took the country by storm, 
culminating in a massive advertising spend in 2015.426 The two major 
companies, FanDuel and DraftKings, attracted hundreds of millions of 
dollars of investments from venture capital firms, media partners, and 
professional sports leagues.427 The two major companies offered three 
prominent types of contests: (1) guaranteed prize pool contests, which 
often involved thousands of contestants vying for prizes of upwards of 
one million dollars in some of the largest contests;428 (2) fifty-fifty 
contests, which involve a large pool of players competing against each 
other (though typically fewer than a guaranteed prize pool contest) and 
the top half of the pool doubles their money;429 and (3) head-to-head 
contests, where two daily fantasy competitors face off against one another 
directly, with the winner taking the other’s money, minus a commission 
or “rake” that the website takes.430 
The relevance of the Wire Act to daily fantasy sports websites is 
potentially significant.431 The primary question facing the daily fantasy 
sports industry, with respect to whether they have exposure under the 
Wire Act, centers on whether daily fantasy sports players are making bets 
and wagers.432 Daily fantasy sports appear to possess many similarities to 
                                                   
424. See Holden, supra note 80. 
425. See John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation in Daily 
Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classification and Consumer Implications, 15 ENT. 
& SPORTS L.J. 1, 2 (2017). 
426. Id. 
427. See Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed Primer 
in Federal and State Gambling Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 126 (2016). 
428. See John T. Holden, Will F. Green & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and Wire 
Fraud, 21 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8, 9 (2017). 
429. Id. 
430. Id. 
431. See Edelman, supra note 427, at 137. 
432. See United States v. McDonough, 835 F.2d 1103, 1104 (5th Cir. 1988) (“A federal statute 
makes criminal the transmission of wagers in interstate commerce. This court held in Martin v. United 
States that such transmission is proscribed whether or not wagering is forbidden by the law of the 
state where the bet is received. That decision determines the law of the circuit, so we affirm a 
conviction for receiving bets on baseball and football games by telephone from Texas to 
Massachusetts despite the lack of evidence or any charge that placing such bets in Massachusetts was 
a state criminal offense.”); Nathaniel J. Ehrman, Out of Bounds?: A Legal Analysis of Pay-to-Play 
Daily Fantasy Sports, 22 SPORTS L. J. 79, 89 (2015). 
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some forms of sports wagering, though whether the contests’ entry fees 
constitute a bet or wager likely depends on state law.433 In Texas, for 
example, it violates state law if a person “makes a bet on the partial or 
final result of a game or contest or on the performance of a participant in 
a game or contest.”434 FanDuel and DraftKings have contended that the 
fantasy sports contestant is the actual competitor, not the professional 
athletes, which would generally allow for an exemption from gambling 
laws and allow for competitors who pay an entry fee to compete in a 
contest and win a prize, but the Texas attorney general dismissed this 
assertion.435 
The determination of whether an entity is a bet or wager is likely 
subject to a state-by-state determination in the case of daily fantasy sports 
operators; but with the congressional intent behind the Wire Act being to 
aid states in enforcing their own laws, it is likely that the federal 
government could act against a daily fantasy sports operator who meets a 
state law definition for illegal gambling.436 Daily fantasy sports 
companies have potential exposure, in particular in states that have 
conclusively found the practices to be illegal. The sites that continue to 
operate, in states such as Texas, are not the only entities with potential 
exposure to Wire Act liability in the new world of state-regulated sports 
wagering.437 
B. Data Partnerships and the Wire Act 
The modern sports betting world relies on many of the same features 
that bookmakers used the wire services for back in the 1950s, though 
today the companies have names like Sportradar and Genius Sports.438 
Sportradar’s business serves three types of customers: “bookmaking 
customers and lotteries; digital and media customers; as well as leagues 
                                                   
433. See Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 425, at 2. 
434. Tex. Op. Att’y Gen. No. KP-0057 at *9 (Jan. 19, 2016) (citing Tex. Penal Code §§ 47.01–.10), 
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Texas-ag-dfs-decision.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4A3-QFY7]. 
435. Id. 
436. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 87-588, at 2 (“The purpose of the bill, as amended, is to amend ‘Chapter 
50: Gambling,’ of title 18, United States Code, with respect to the transmission of bets, wagers, and 
related information, to assist the several States in the enforcement of their laws pertaining to 
gambling . . . .”). There is also an essential analysis of whether the websites are in the business of 
betting, which is discussed in supra section III.B. 
437. See Ryan Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy Sports State-by-State Tracker, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/14799449/daily-fantasy-dfs-legal-your-state-state-state-look 
[https://perma.cc/6U6A-CGB9]. 
438. See John Holden & Mike Schuster, The Sham of Integrity Fees in Sports Betting, 16 NYU J.L. 
& BUS. 35 (2019). 
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and competition organizers.”439 While both Sportradar and Genius Sports 
operate integrity services that monitor for irregular betting line 
movements that may indicate nefarious activity, their principal money-
making business is selling sports data.440 
The potential exposure under the Wire Act for data providers is 
dependent on a number of factors, but as both companies are official data 
suppliers of professional sports leagues, evaluating potential liability is 
worthwhile.441 First, the locations of both the originating and receiving 
groups must be analyzed. As we are most likely addressing the sale of 
betting or wagering information, as opposed to bets or wagers themselves, 
the Wire Act’s safe harbor appears relevant.442 While a number of states 
have expressed an interest in legalizing sports wagering, only a handful 
have done so, leaving many areas of the country still inhospitable to 
transmit “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers.”443 For 
betting information that originates from a state that has not legalized the 
type of betting fueled by the data sold from a prohibited jurisdiction, there 
is a potential problem under the Wire Act. 
A second point of analysis is whether it is possible for data companies 
to argue that they are engaging with the data “for use in news reporting of 
sporting events.”444 But this seems unlikely with respect to the delivery of 
information to sportsbooks themselves,445 though it is possible that data 
companies’ sales to legitimate news clients may be protected by not only 
the Wire Act’s safe harbor, but also by the First Amendment.446 Unlike 
the sale to legitimate news enterprises, the sale to sportsbooks is obviously 
for powering a business engaged in betting or wagering.447 The most 
                                                   
439. Taylor Bloom, The Evolution of Sportradar, SPORTTECHIE (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.sporttechie.com/the-evolution-of-sportradar [https://perma.cc/HBV9-L8RK]. 
440. See Holden & Schuster, supra note 438, at 45, 49. 
441. See Matt Rybaltowski, Shakedown Fees: NBA, MLB Demanding Nevada Sportsbooks Pay 
More or Get Cut Off, SPORTSHANDLE (May 2, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/nba-mlb-demands-
data-fee-nv-sportsbooks [https://perma.cc/Y66K-PU8S]. 
442. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (1994). 
443. Id.; see also Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where 
Every State Stands, ESPN (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/19740480/the-
united-states-sports-betting-where-all-50-states-stand-legalization [https://perma.cc/VZG4-HPFQ]. 
444. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(b) (2018). 
445. See Rybaltowski, supra note 441. 
446. See generally Ryan M. Rodenberg, Asa D. Brown & John T. Holden, Real-Time Data and 
The First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 63 (2015). 
447. Matt Rybaltowski, Tempers Flare At Panel On Official Sports Betting Data Requirements, 
SPORTSHANDLE (May 17, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/official-data-conference-panel/ 
[https://perma.cc/W5SU-HL94] (noting that real-time “data is the fuel that powers the in-play 
[betting] engine”). 
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significant question is likely whether the information being transmitted is 
within the scope of the Wire Act. 
Whether the Wire Act’s prohibition on the transmission of 
“information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers” encapsulates the 
type of data being sold to sportsbooks requires one to analyze what type 
of information assists in the placing of bets or wagers.448 The impetus for 
the Wire Act was to target the means by which organized crime was able 
to run its bookmaking operations, notably the use of wire services that 
provided scores and other information that bookmakers could use to set 
and adjust the betting lines they shared with their customers.449 While the 
Rhode Island District Court in Baborian opined that the sharing of 
opinions on which games had value to wager on was outside the scope of 
the Wire Act,450 in Scavo, the Eighth Circuit rejected the argument that 
suppliers of betting line information are beyond the reach of the Wire 
Act.451 In another case, the supplying of betting lines and weather reports 
was viewed by the Eighth Circuit as potential information assisting in 
placing bets or wagers.452 In United States v. Reeder,453 the Eighth Circuit 
found that the provisioning of scores and late breaking information 
constituted information within the scope of the Wire Act.454 The 
determinations of whether the type of information being sold by data 
providers to sportsbooks and whether the safe harbor provision of the 
Wire Act is triggered, are likely fact-dependent inquiries, but the scope of 
which information courts have determined assist in the placing of bets or 
wagers may be problematic for some companies. 
V. RE-WRITING THE WIRE ACT 
The reality of modern day sports gambling is that much of it takes place 
in interstate commerce and illegally.455 Indeed, the illegal sports gambling 
market presents gamblers with some advantages over the legal market, 
with the existence of the Wire Act likely having an impact on some of 
                                                   
448. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994); see supra section III.D. 
449. See supra Part II. 
450. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 331 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom. United States 
v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 
451. United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 841 (8th Cir. 1979). 
452. See Truchinski v. United States, 393 F.2d 627, 631 (8th Cir. 1968). 
453. 614 F.3d 1179 (8th Cir. 1980). 
454. Id. at 1185. 
455. See Brett Smiley, How the U.S. Legal Sports Betting Business is Fundamentally 
Disadvantaged, SPORTSHANDLE (Nov. 21, 2019), https://sportshandle.com/legal-sports-betting-
disadvantages/ [https://perma.cc/FH72-MA72]. 
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these factors.456 The expansion of legal sports gambling across the country 
has brought about a need to modernize the Wire Act to better reflect 
modern commerce and enable betting operators to offer products that can 
be competitive with offshore operators who are illegally accepting wagers 
from individuals located within the United States. The foundational 
question if the Wire Act is to be left in place is what should be done to 
clarify the intended scope of the statute.457 The uncertainty that has been 
interjected into the Wire Act’s scope as a result of the 2018 Engel memo 
has caused legislators and operators to take caution.458 While clarity over 
the scope of the Wire Act would calm the gambling industry’s nerves, 
certain clarifications to the statute should be considered in order to make 
legal sports betting more competitive with the illegal market. Thus, 
providing a viable alternative certain clarifications to the statute should be 
considered. 
The first consideration would be to adopt the language from the UIGEA 
in regard to intermediate routing, thereby clarifying a major question mark 
surrounding the Wire Act’s scope. At present, if information originating 
in a state with legal sports betting like Oregon passes through states like 
Washington, where sports betting currently remains illegal, the Wire Act 
may be implicated even if the end destination of that information is a 
jurisdiction with legal sports betting, such as Nevada.459 The adoption of 
the intermediate routing language from the UIGEA would bring 
consistency to federal statutes affecting sports gambling, something that 
is presently lacking.460 Adding certainty to the questions surrounding the 
intermediate routing of information through states like Washington, 
where sports gambling remains illegal, is but one means of improving the 
Wire Act for contemporary society. 
There is also a need to better define what is within the scope of the term 
“information.” At present, there remains a great deal of uncertainty as to 
just what information is included within the “information” assisting in the 
placing of bets or wagers.461 The absence of enumerated pieces of 
“information” within the statute has left lawyers with questions as to what 
exactly triggers this clause of the statute. While we know the transmission 
                                                   
456. Id.  
457. See supra section III.C. 
458. See A Guide to Understanding the Wire Act, PLAYUSA, https://www.playusa.com/us/wire-
act/ [https://perma.cc/8ZC7-DPBJ]. 
459. See supra section III.E. 
460. See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(E) (2006) (“The intermediate routing of electronic data shall not 
determine the location or locations in which a bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.”). 
461. See supra section III.D. 
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of betting line information is sufficient to implicate this clause462—and 
opinions on who will prevail in a game are not sufficient463—there 
remains a great deal of ambiguity as to what other pieces of information 
constitute “information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any 
sporting event or contest.”464 An enumerated list of types of information 
used by bookmakers would add certainty to the statute, perhaps inclusion 
of things like: (1) betting odds; (2) injury information; (3) expected 
weather; and (4) starting lineups. While many of these items would have 
legitimate uses in news reporting, such activity is already protected by the 
second clause of the statute.465 
A more dramatic amendment to the Wire Act would be to allow for 
interstate wagering in states that both allow the same types of wagers.466 
The Wire Act was never intended to exist in a world with widespread 
legalized sports betting, it was passed in an era when gambling was almost 
wholly illegal. An amendment to the statute that allows for interstate 
wagers to be placed between jurisdictions with legal wagering could 
enable a more competitive betting market that is better able to compete 
with the illegal market by allowing consumers to shop for better prices 
before placing a wager.467 Meanwhile, allowing the Wire Act’s safe 
harbor to protect bets, as well as information in assisting bets, would be 
one means of combatting the illegal sports betting market, by adding 
competition to the legal market likely generating better prices for 
consumers. However, the most impactful change regarding the Wire Act 
would not require amending the statute at all. 
One of the biggest impediments to eradication of the illegal market is 
the lack of enforcement of federal gambling laws.468 The lack of 
                                                   
462. See United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 840 (8th Cir. 1979). 
463. United States v. Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324, 331 (D.R.I. 1981), rev’d sub nom. United States 
v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983). 
464. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1994). 
465. See id. § 1084(b). 
466. Presently, the Wire Act only allows interstate transmission of information assisting in placing 
of bets or wagers between legal jurisdictions. See United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 713 (1st Cir. 
2014); United States v. Bala, 489 F.3d 334, 342 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. McDonough, 835 
F.2d 1103, 1104–05 (5th Cir. 1988). 
467. There is evidence that bookmakers exploit fans’ biases towards local teams. See David 
Purdum & Doug Kezirian, The ‘Homer Effect’: A New Bookmaking Quandary, ABC NEWS (June 19, 
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/homer-effect-bookmaking-quandary/story?id=56010419 
[https://perma.cc/Q8BU-AKWM]. 
468. See Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America: Hearing Before the Crime, 
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. & Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. 
(2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/JU/JU08/20180927/108721/HHRG-115-JU08-Wstate-
BruningJ-20180927.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NA3-X4D4] (written testimony of Jon C. Bruning, 
Managing Partner, Bruning Law Grp.). 
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enforcement of gambling laws like the Wire Act has been a major 
component in the proliferation of illegal gambling. This lack of 
enforcement, and the seeming ubiquity of gambling that has resulted, has 
led to questions being raised over the fairness of enforcing gambling laws 
against anyone.469 Much of the confusion surrounding the Wire Act could 
be resolved by a consistent approach to prosecuting illegal sports 
gambling operations. Absent a renewed commitment to enforcement of 
the statute, illegal gambling operators are likely to maintain an advantage 
over legal operators, as the likelihood of there being any consequences for 
their illegal actions are minimal. 
As states like Washington begin to consider whether to legalize sports 
gambling or even to expand their existing gambling offerings to include 
online gambling, the Wire Act casts a large shadow.470 States such as 
Washington, which have a large tribal gaming presence, face a difficult 
challenge in passing new gambling bills as the tribes and states have 
existing gaming compacts, which the authorization of a new type of 
wagering activity threatens to disrupt.471 As a result of the more 
complicated gaming landscape in Washington State, and others similarly 
situated, it is possible that there will be some movement from the federal 
government to clarify or amend the Wire Act before legal sports betting 
makes its arrival. 
CONCLUSION 
The Wire Act, which was passed before the moon landing, is now 
antiquated, having been drafted long before the internet and the 
reintroduction of lotteries, which came about in 1964.472 Attempts to 
regulate the current world of legalized and state-regulated sports wagering 
with a statute that never endeavored to address such a world is sure to 
create difficulties. The challenges facing legalized sports betting are 
numerous, but chief among them is the ability to operate as a 
                                                   
469. See John Holden, Breaking Down The Rise and Fall of Legendz Sportsbook, Part II, LEGAL 
SPORTS REP. (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/32871/legendz-sportsbook-sports-
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470. The Washington Gambling Commission held hearings in October 2019 with one stakeholder 
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22, 2019), https://www.legalsportsreport.com/35707/mlb-washington-state-sports-betting/ 
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Ahead, OLYMPIAN (May 17, 2019), https://www.theolympian.com/latest-news/article230517364.html (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2020). 
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commercially viable entity in states that authorize sports betting, which 
may be threatened if activities like pooling offend the Wire Act. 
The Wire Act’s reinterpretation by the Department of Justice in 2018 
adds increased focus to the deficiencies in the statute. The legislative 
history quite conclusively illustrates that neither Congress nor the authors 
in the Justice Department intended a broad statute that applied far beyond 
bookmakers and layoff wagering. The current interpretation appears to be 
an exercise of the executive branch interpreting laws in a fashion such that 
the legislative branch is removed from the process, as the 2018 Wire Act 
memorandum accomplishes what Congress failed to do via RAWA. 
The Wire Act will continue to be a prominent focus as online wagering 
continues to expand. Unfortunately for the sports gambling industry, the 
Wire Act remains a very significant obstacle to realizing the true revenue 
potential of a widely legal market. Barring repeal or substantial revision, 
the Wire Act casts a vast shadow over both the legal and illegal sports 
gambling industries. 
 
